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ABSTRACT
The environmental impact assessment process for offshore
oil and gas lease sales was considered by writing summaries
for five recent EISs and then sending these summaries along
with a set of guiding questions to people who had
participated in the EIA process for each particular EIS. The
comments of these participants were combined with information
from the literature (particularly statements from industry
sources for which commentors could not be found) to
characterize the opinions of those involved in the EIA
process for offshore oil and gas lease sales as to how well
the process has been working.
There have been three phases of increasingly expanded
and accelerated leasing in the U.S. In the third phase the
Reagan administration has streamlined the process in order to
accelerate leasing as much as possible.
The Department of Interior does not appear to adequately
rely on the best scientific information and methods of
analysis. The amount of information in the EISs tends to
obscure more than it clarifies. The most up to date
information is not always in the EIS. Factual errors are
common but probably declining. Generalized and outdated
estimates are too commonly used. There appears now to be a
policy of using estimates that emphasize the least dramatic
impacts. The accuracy of forecasting models seems variable
in practice. The estimates of ecosystem resiliency and
cumulative impacts have little scientific basis.
There are too few warnings about potential environmental
problems. Alternatives to the main EIS proposal are not
often genuinely different nor are they given equal anaylsis.
There does not appear to be a willingness to consider new
alternatives throughout the EIA process. The potential
severity of impacts is not well described in the EISs.
Although the public is usually alerted to DOI activity,
it is not being provided with adequate mechanisms for
involvement in the decision making. The public has little
access to the process. Opportunities for post-lease sale
participation are limited. The graphic presentation of the
EISs usually fails to be sufficiently informative for
purposes of public involvement. Comprehensive and readable
summaries are needed. Relations between federal and state
governments over offshore activities are strained.
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Very few projects or policies likely to cause
environmental harm are delayed, modified or canceled.
Comments on the draft EIS are rarely incorporated into the
final EIS in a significant way. Tract selection and
mitigation measures are little influenced by EISs.
In summary, the effects of the EIA process on leasing
decisions are very limited.
Improvement in the offshore oil and gas lease sale EIA
process will come about only when data collection and
interpretation are improved and when the process is much more
open to public participation. Decisions must no longer be
made before the EIA process begins. However, changes must
include a major role for DOI, must be politically acceptable
and must help expedite the process.
A system of "intervenor debates" is proposed. DOI would
act as a provider of information and funds to groups seeking
to have a role in the decision making. These groups would
research and debate their proposals for offshore leasing
before a decision making-board composed of representatives
from DOI, EPA and NOAA. The final decision would involve a
negotiated compromise between competing alternatives. Costs
and delays should be reduced since all parties would have a
role and a political stake in the process and thereby
reducing the likelihood of litigation.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Susskind
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
A thesis is often as much the process of its research
and production as it is the final words. This is especially
true for this effort. The following represents only part of
my work as an assistant editor for Environmental Impact
Assessment Review's special issue on the environmental
impact assessment process for offshore oil and gas lease
sales (Volume 4, Numbers 3-4). As the lead assistant
editor, I was deeply involved in the conceptualization of
the issue, recruiting of authors, editing, and production.
The article beginning on page 7 was the central article
of the special issue concerning the EIA process in the US.
The article describes how the research was done and the
conclusions were reached. But it should be stressed that
much of the value of the special issue lies in its coverage
of the EIA process for other countries, and the reader is
encouraged to consult the issue itself for articles on
Norway, United Kingdom, Ireland and Canada. There are also
valuable articles which discuss the use of negotiation for
the lease sale process.
Three of the five summaries that were produced for the
project are included here. These summaries were provided as
background information to the experts (Commentors) I
questioned about the lease sale process. The summaries are
included here because they can help the reader of the thesis
to better understand what was in the EISs that the
Commentors and I were critiquing. They also represent a
major part of the effort that went into the issue. The two
summaries not included here were orginally written by
Assissant Editor Lisa Berzok and then edited by me.
It is my hope that those decision makers considering
changes in the EIA process for offshore oil and gas will
find this work informative and useful. The system needs
reform and the public needs access to the process. These
pages express the voices of the public and I hope that they
are heeded.
6
Expand and Accelerate:
Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing
and the EIA Process
Bruce J. Stedman
Bruce Stedman served as Assistant Editor for this
special issue of EIA Review. Currently, he is
Conservation Director of the New England Rivers
Center in Boston and leads a tutorial course in
Conservation Biology at Harvard University.
On January 27, 1969, a development well blew out off the coast 6f Santa
Barbara, California, spilling 21,500 tons of crude oil into the Pacific
Ocean over a span of ten days. This accident became a dramatic symbol
of the environmental risks inherent in efforts to find and produce
petroleum on the outer continental shelves of the world. In addition,
the blowout galvanized what was a growing environmental movement
in the United States and prompted the U S Congress to pass the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (Lee 1975, Liroff 1976, US
General Accounting Office 1981).
Signed into law on the first day of the 1970s, NEPA has
precipitated vast quantities of research, theory-building and practice
in environmental impact assessment (EIA) over the past decade and a
half. Surprisingly, however, given the triggering effect of the Santa
Barbara spill, there has been relatively little research on the effects of
EIA on offshore oil and gas leasing.'
The past three years have marked the beginning of a
particularly important period of change in US federal land leasing and
policy making (Clawson 1983). The same can be said for outer
continental shelf (OCS) policy. During this period the Department of
Interior (DOI) - through the Minerals Management Service (MMS) -
has implemented the latest and most extreme of its "expanded and
accelerated" leasing programs by using "area-wide" and
"streamlined" leasing procedures (see Summary of Five-Year Lease
Sale Schedule Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) for details);
the Supreme Court has made important decisions regarding the
Coastal Zone Management Act's "consistency provision"; and
legislation is being considered by Congress to remove from leasing
certain frontier petroleum areas that are fragile or commercially
valuable for fishing. All of these developments suggest that this is an
Lni"nmental Impact Asssment Review, VA, N.3-4 EIA REVIEW 4/3-4 287
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excellent time to reexamine our offshore petroleum leasing policies
and the role that environmental impact assessment plays in those
policies.
As part of this reexamination, this article relies on four main
sources of information: 1) summaries of five EISs written since 1977 for
offshore petroleum leasing;2 2) comments and criticisms from a sample
of experts who were involved in the EIA processes resulted in the
production and use of these EISs (referred to herein as "Commentors");
3) recent literature on the offshore leasing process and EIA; and 4)
previous reviews of other types of EISs and EIA processes.
Based on these sources of information, I have tried to summarize
how impact assessment is being used in the OCS leasing process and
more importantly, how the quality and use of EISs for making leasing
decisions might be improved.
DECISION MAKING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
During its brief history, offshore EIA for oil and gas leasing has been
the focus of a major debate between three groups with very different
perceptions about how and how well the process works. The
Department of Interior sells and manages the leases and therefore
writes the EISs. The oil and gas industry leases the OCS and then
explores for and produces petroleum. The locally affected public -
represented by state and local governments and independent
environmental groups-receives the impacts of petroleum activities.
Some of these impacts are positive (jobs, lower fuel prices and
increased government revenues) but there are also many that are
negative.
The debate between these groups centers around the influence
that participants will have in the decisions about federal offshore
leases. Industry generally believes that there are too many regulations
which slow petroleum exploration and production and that decisions
are too often changed by litigation. For its part, DOI takes the position
that it is in the national interest to get more petroleum from the OCS as
quickly as possible while heeding what they regard as appropriate
environmental caution. Some segments of the public, however,
believes that offshore safeguards are too often inadequate, that
decisions are made without adequate public involvement, and that as
the recipients of the impacts of petroleum activities, they need greater
opportunities for direct input into leasing decisions.
This paper is primarilya look at the public's concerns about the
offshore EIA process. It was difficult to obtain industry comments
about how the system is working and the federal government's point of
view is well documented in the EISs themselves and other
publications. The major emphasis here is to provide an overview of
what critics of the process find lacking and to suggest one way that the
process might be improved to account for these perceived
shortcomings. While this approach is to a degree one-sided, it is also
based on the recognition that the major complaint of both the federal
government and industry -that there are too many delays in leasing
288 EIA REVIEW 4/3-4
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and petroleum production - will remain as long as the concerns of the
public continue to have only limited avenues for expression.
Ways of achieving agreement and compromise among these
three debaters must be found. A system that sponsored structural and
purposeful EIS debates could achieve this goal. As outlined in the final
section of the paper, such a system would place the burden of
developing different proposals for leasing on the shoulders of each of
the affected parties, industry, environmental groups and the states.
DOI would produce the baseline reports for use by the debaters, and
along with representatives of other federal agencies, would sit on a
decision-making panel charged with the responsibility for hearing the
proposals and determining how leasing should occur. This would be a
far cry from the current system in which the affected groups are only
able to react to proposals presented to them by DOI.
As a prelude to describing a system of EIS debates the following
sections outline the history of leasing and the EIA process for offshore
petroleum activities in the US and look carefully at the criticisms of the
groups affected by the leasing. The final section outlines the EISs
debates system in more detail.
A SHORT HISTORY OF OFFSHORE PETROLEUM
LEASING AND POLICY
Creating a National Offshore Policy
Prior to 1970, offshore leasing was controlled entirely by the 1953
Submerged Lands Act (SLA) and OCS Lands Act (OCSLA). The SLA
formally established state ownership of the OCS for three miles out
(5.56 kilometers) from the traditional tide lands (the territorial sea),
and left the rest of the OCS in federal control (Lee 1975).3 The OCSLA
institutionalized the United States' claims to the minerals of the OCS,
including rights of exploration and exploitation, and established a
leasing program to stimulate private development of ocean resources
(Mallon 1974). It also delegated overall regulatory authority over oil
exploration and development to DOI (Murphy and Belsky 1980).
Federal offshore leasing began in 1954. During the period 1954
to 1969 oil activity was not especially controversial since the area leased
each year by DOI was relatively small (Table 1); 98.6 percent of the area
leased was in the Gulf of Mexico (Swiler 1983). Nor was there any
substantial congressional review of OCS activities (Murphy and Belsky
1980).
Three dramatic events between 1969 and 1973 changed public
and congressional perceptions regarding offshore petroleum leasing
and the need to protect the environment affected by offshore
operations: the Santa Barbara spill, the passage of NEPA, and finally,
three years later, the Arab oil embargo. Each contributed significantly
to the development of two parallel, competing and somewhat
counterbalancing trends in offshore leasing. The nation wanted to
become energy independent, in part by exploiting the potential of
offshore oil and gas. At the same time the nation wanted its
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environment protected. For the most part, offshore leasing has
expanded and accelerated almost continuously throughout the past
decade (Table 1), but a few lease sales have been cancelled or delayed
(Table 1 in Summary of the Five-Year Lease Sale Schedules), and in
some cases major conditions have been imposed to modify the terms of
the lease.
The Santa Barbara spill made clear to the public, Congress and
DOI what was already being said by some scientists -offshore oil and
gas operations were not necessarily benign activities. There were
serious environmental risks involved. Coming at a time of increasing
concern about the health of the environment, the blowout became a
major catalyst for the next major event: passage of NEPA. Although
Congress had been considering some type of legislation like NEPA for
Table 1. Annual Summary of Offshore Lease Sales, 1954-1983.
Area Leased Total Average bonus
Leasing # of (hectares bonus* paid paid per ha
period Year sales x10,000) (million S) (S)
1954 3 19.7 442.7 2247.2
1955 1 16.3 333.9 2048.5
1956 0 0 0 ---
1957 0 0 0 ---
1958 0 0 0 - - -
1959 2 6.9 253.6 3675.4
1960 2 28.6 687.3 2403.1
Before 1961 0 0 0 -..
1962 3 78.1 1333.4 1707.3
oil 1963 1 12.7 34.4 270.9
1964 2 24.8 254.8 1027.4
embargo 1965 1 2.9 88.0 3034.5
1966 3 5.7 531.2 9319.3
1967 2 30.2 1258.9 4168.5
1968 3 37.8 3189.2 8437.0
1969 3 4.6 251.1 5458.7
1970 2 24.2 2005.6 8287.6
1971 1 1.4 195.9 13992.9
1972 2 33.4 4434.3 13276.3
1973 2 41.8 5715.7 13673.9
1974 5 71.3 8393.0 11771.4
1975 4 68.0 1665.9 2449.9
I*" 1976 4 51.7 3242.6 6272.0
1977 2 44.6 2133.0 4782.5
1978 4 52.8 2233.0 4229.2
II 1979 6 71.5 5760.4 8056.5
1980 3 45.9 4204.6 9160.3
1981 7 90.5" 5982.2" 6610.2"
III 1982 5 76.3 3426.6 4491.0
1983 8 266.9 4770.9 1787.5
*. 1 fk I-p, y t ese n0 orJL Ler o4C
1980 dollars.) racts on the OCS. ( values are in
Part of one lease sale in 1981 was still under court challenge at the time of this
writing. Figures given include only the uncontested portion of the sale.
* Three periods of expanded and accelerated leasing. See text for details.
Data from Essertier 1983
290 EIA REVIEW 4/3-4
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some time, passage became assured after the spill because such a major
accident demanded a congressional gesture of concern; a vote for
NEPA was clearly symbolic of that concern (Liroff 1976, Kameron
1978).
The passage of NEPA and several other related environmental
laws4 in the early 1970s began to place a considerably greater burden of
environmental proof on DOI for the sale of offshore leases. Under
NEPA, EISs were required for major federal actions affecting the
environment, and by 1974, following a lawsuit over leasing off
Southern California, DOI began to routinely write EISs for lease sales.
The environmental impacts of offshore petroleum activities had just
become a major concern of the federal government in the early 1970s
when an equally strong, if not stronger, concern was prompted by the
third major event, the 1973 oil embargo. In the view of many observers,
the US was (and remains today) vulnerable because of its dependency
on imported oil (Russell and Zimmerman 1983), and a major re-
evaluation of the nation's oil and gas development future was needed.
Three Phases of Expanded and Accelerated Offshore Leasing
"Energy independence" became the motto of the federal government's
attempts to frame a national energy policy in the mid-70s, and this
emphasis had major conflicts with efforts to also make environmental
protection an important part of the new policy. The search for new
petroleum sources began to shift to "frontier" areas in the north
Atlantic and off central California and Alaska (where no leasing or
discoveries had yet occurred). As the decade progressed, however,
several large oil tanker groundings, two more offshore oil spills from
blowouts in other countries, and experience with the public
participation aspects of NEPA brought offshore leasing under greater
scrutiny (Robadue and Tippie 1980). A complete rewriting of the O CS
Lands Act in 1978 reflected both a public and congressional demand
for environmental caution concerning offshore leases, and the
conflicting interest in finding more offshore petroleum reserves. The
OCS Lands Act as amended (OCSLAA) attempted to resolve this
conflict by mandating that a balance be maintained between different
uses of the OCS. The conflict was not resolved, but instead was restated
as an argument over how the proper balance was to be achieved.
The federal government's efforts to define and implement a
national energy policy and an accompanying policy on offshore
petroleum development resulted in three major periods of increasingly
expanded and accelerated offshore leasing by DOI. For each of these
three periods, Table 2 lists the Five-Year OCS Lease Sale Schedules
(Five-Year Schedules) prepared by DOI to implement its offshore
policies and Table 1 documents sales.
The first period of expansion actually began before the Arab oil
embargo with President Nixon's energy message of April 1973. He
proposed to expedite the leasing of the OCS, to more than triple
production. The oil embargo served to hasten the implementation of
the President's suggestions (Koppleman and Robbins 1980), which
EIA REVIEW 4/3-4 291
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were further developed in his 1974 energy message outlining "Project
Independence" and in a new Five-Year Schedule announced in
November of that year.
At the same time, congressional reviews of OCS laws and
policies resulted in extensive inquiries into DOI's approaches to
leasing and the first attempts to amend OCSLA. What began as
reluctant cooperation with Congress by the Nixon/Ford
administrations deteriorated to "hostile opposition";
the expressed attitude [of these administrations] was that the
need to increase domestic sources of energy outweighed
criticisms as to [offshore] practices, possible risks, and
inadequate laws (Murphy and Belsky 1980).
This attitude changed toward the end of the first major period of
offshore leasing. With development of his National Energy Plan and
passage of amendments to the OCSLA. Carter like Nixon and Ford,
demonstrated his commitment to expanding and accelerating offshore
leasing. However, his administration was much more interested than
the previous two had been in finding a balance between environmental
protection and expedited offshore development. As a result, they
wanted the OCSLA amended and worked actively with Congress to
find compromises that would assure the bill's passage. To many, the
OCSLAA embodied the federal government's offshore leasing policy
which
sought to assure the expedited development of [offshore]
resources and also to promote at the same time better
planning and information, increased competition, safer
operations, and more state, local, and citizen imput and
assistance (Murphy and Belsky 1980).
Although the newly appointed Carter DOI had writen two new
Five-Year Lease Schedules outlining their leasing goals in 1977, the
number of sales expected and the rate of selling leases did not increase
from the earlier Nixon/Ford schedules (Table 2). Once OCSLAA was
passed, however, the US entered its second major phase of expanded
and accelerated leasing, and the Carter DOI developed a new schedule
in June 1979, which increased by ten the number of sales planned for
the ensuing five years (Table 2). By mid-1980, DOI was planning to
expand and accelerate leasing even more by adding five more sales and
had begun to consider area-wide leasing. This new approach would
eliminate most prelease tract selection by DOI and allow industry
representatives a much freer hand in deciding which tracts had the
most potential and which they wished to bid on during lease sales.
Ideas about how to implement area-wide leasing were never
finalized by the Carter administration, but were picked up by the
incoming Reagan DOI, expanded, and implemented in their 1982
Five-Year Schedule (US General Accounting Office 1981). The
beginning of the third major period, this Five-Year Schedule carried
the expansion of offshore leasing to its logical extreme by setting out a
plan to offer (with some few exceptions) the entire US OCS for lease.
292 EIA REVIEW 4/3-4
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The rate of leasing was further accelerated, as well, to 8.4 sales per year
(Table 2).
Table 2. Proposed Offshore Lease Schedules Before the 1973 Arab Oil
Embargo and During Three Subsequent Periods of Expanded and
Accelerated Leasing.
# of Average
Lease # of planned sales
schedule Time frame years sales per year
Before oil Jun 1971 06/71-12/75 4.5 12 2.7
embargo Jul 1973 07/73-12/78 5.5 15 2.7
Periods of I Nov 1974 11/74-12/78 4.0 24 6.0
Expanded and Jun 1975 06/75-12/78 3.5 22 6.3
Accelerated Jan 1977 01/77-12/80 4.0 24 6.0
Leasing May 1977 05/77-12/78 1.5 8 5.3
Aug 1977 08/77-12/81 4.5 21 4.7
II Jun 1979 06/79-02/85 5.5 31 5.6
Jun 1980 06/80-06/85 5.0 36 7.2
III Apr 1981 01/82-12/86 5.0 42 8.4
Jul 1981 01/82-12/86 5.0 42 8.4
Adapted from US General Accounting Office 1981
OCS Leasing Policy, Petroleum Production
and Environmental Protection
Each of the successive expansions and accelerations of offshore leasing
over the past decade has been justified by the US position as an oil
importer. For example, Darius Gaskins, DOI's OCS Program
Coordinator in 1975 indicated that
looking at the energy situation in a national perspective, the
problem, as you all know, is that we have become
increasingly dependent on unstable, expensive foreign
supplies of energy. . . . We are importing more than six
million barrels (bbls) [850,000 tons of oil] a day, at an
annual cost to the economy of more than 20 billion dollars
[$30.6 billion in 1980 dollars] (Gaskins 1975).
By 1980, the US was still importing 885,000 tons of oil each day and the
bill had increased to $78.6 billion each year (West 1981 as cited in
Shirley 1982).
In addition to the federal government, industry has been
equally concerned. One spokesman noted that
It is almost a cliche to say that the United States is a hostage
of foreign oil, yet it remains true . . . It is not a question of
whether this nation should develop its available [offshore]
energy resources. Dire necessity makes the question not if
but how (Lassiter 1980 as cited in Shirly 1982).
In 1975, the US was producing about 130,000 tons of oil per day
from the OCS. Gaskins (1975) reported that DOI optimistically
EIA REVIEW 4/3-4 293
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believed that the OCS was the "prime alternative" to foreign supplies
of oil and that Project Independence could increase OCS production
by more than 500,000 tons per day. However, by 1980 the US was
producing even less OCS oil than it had been in 1975, only 109,000 tons
per day (Essertier 1983).5
DOI had not seen OCS production as the sole alternative to oil
imports, but it was considered the most likely mechanism for rapidly
increasing energy production. When this did not occur, calls increased
for reducing OCS regulations and delays. The failure to improve OCS
production was cited by the incoming Reagan Administration as a
major reason for implementing a new round (and fundamentally new
type) of expanded and accelerated leasing (US General Accounting
Office 1981). However, these earlier efforts to get more production
from the OCS did not have sufficient time to be successful. Some of the
failure can be attributed to the time lags inherent in the
implementation of new leasing schedules and to the long periods
needed for exploration, discovery and development of newly acquired
leases. Indeed, there has not yet been a commercially viable discovery of
oil in any of the OCS areas designated as frontier areas since 1973.
The petroleum industry offers a different explanation for the
failure to increase offshore production in the 1970s - too much
opposition and government regulation:
Much of the delay in federal oil and gas leasing, particularly
in offshore areas, is the result of unwarranted opposition. In
a number of instances, state governments and environmental
groups have blocked or delayed lease sales through court
challenges. Moreover, environmental laws and regulations-
including the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, the
National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act and a
host of others-have been used to delay offshore operations
(American Petroleum Institute 1981 as cited in Shirley 1982).
For others, a third reason for the failure to improve production
in the late 1970s was the lack of a comprehensive and clear energy and
offshore policy upon which to base leasing.
In public statements, federal participants in the offshore leasing
process often seem confident about their articulation of a clear energy
policy. One suggested that over the previous decade
the larger national policy desire to reduce dependence on
foreign oil overrode all else, and has been the major
underlying impetus toward exploration of the frontier areas
(Brun 1982).
Nixon's Project Independence, Carter's National Energy Plan and
amendments to the OCSLA and Reagan's introduction of streamlined
leasing procedures and area-wide leasing were all indications that
from the perspective of the federal government a national energy
policy was in place.
Other observers, however, questioned whether a sufficiently
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comprehensive energy policy, including a policy for offshore leasing,
was developed during the 1970s. The time for developing a lease sale
and then proceeding with exploratory drilling has been much more
lengthy than originally anticipated in the Five-Year Schedules, often
due to court challenges to different steps in the environmental
assessment process (Murphy and Belsky 1980). Citing the Georges
Bank Lease Sale #42 as an example, Charles Colgan suggests that these
delays occurred because
despite the clear national energy problems, there was simply
not sufficient [national public] consensus on management
policies for the oceans to allow rapid development of OCS
resources (Colgan 1982).
Delays of leasing in the mid-Atlantic were caused, in the view of
Basile and Karline (1982), by "negative" public attitudes about
offshore activities engendered by the statistical certainty of spills and
the perceived "injustice" of drilling being proposed in the absence of a
national energy policy. C. L. Blackburn, Executive Vice President of
Shell Oil Company also noted that a
- favorable governmental [policy] framework needs to have
long term predictability, since the time from lease sale to
production in some offshore areas may span two-to-four
administrations. The on-again-off-again-lease schedules and
energy policies of the past decade have contributed to the
current and potential shortages of trained people and
equipment (Blackburn 1981 as cited in Shirley 1982).
The view that energy policy in the 1970s was inadequate and/or
poorly articulated is further strengthened by Robadue and Tippie's
(1980) finding that national energy policies were rarely cited as the
basis for criticizing leasing decisions. Of course, as noted above, it is
possible to argue that the very simple "expand and accelerate" stance
constitutes a national policy. If that is taken as the case, there is
essentially no substantive position available for criticism. In fact what
seem to have been the case is that instead of a single energy policy, there
were (and are) many federal, state and local policies that are often in
conflict (Wenner 1982). It is these state and local policies that are often
cited in comments on the drafts of offshore leasing EISs.
It is clear, from its development of the original proposals for
area-wide and streamlined leasing, that the Carter Administration was
interested in expanding and accelerating offshore development. But its
support of OCSLAA also indicates an interest in balancing offshore
production with environmental protection. While the Carter
adminisration's commitment to balance may not have been as strong
as many critics would have prefered, it was much stronger than for any
the other Administrations of the past decade.
By taking (very strongly) the position that industry should be
given as free a hand as possible to decide which tracts are to be leased
(by allowing open bidding in area-wide lease sales), the Reagan DOI
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has institutionalized a simplified policy-to expand and accelerate
offshore leasing - thereby undermining the previous administration's
well intentioned (although inadequate) efforts to balance offshore
production and environmental quality.
The issues are more complex and numerous than simply trying
to determine how to get more petroleum from the OCS as fast as
possible or even trying to balance offshore production with
environmental quality. Other essential issues include: conflicts of use
(particularly with major fishing areas); the best and safest procedures
for developing the technologies needed for deep water and Arctic
drilling; whether any critical environmental areas should be off-limits
to exploratation; industry's capacity to expeditiously explore leases;
royalties for affected states; and the precise contribution OCS
production is expected to make to US energy needs over the foreseeable
long term.
Some members of the public and Congress continue to believe
that the US should develop and implement a comprehensive national
energy policy before rushing ahead with leasing the OCS. Such a
policy would clearly identify how each of the sources of energy are to be
acquired, and at what costs; which should be given federal support and
of what type; and what environmental impacts can be expected from
each. This policy should also involve a long-term approach and reflect
what the country's energy needs will be in the future.
Over simplification must be avoided. For example, Senator
William Bradley (D-NJ) has suggested that our policy should be one of
"vulnerability reduction," rather than simply reduction of oil imports.
If this were the case, he believes "there [would be] no overriding
national need to cast caution to the wind" concerning offshore leasing.
In his view, energy producers should be induced to develop offshore oil
and gas supplies at a rate dictated by two factors, economic efficiency
and environmental protection (Bradley 1982). For both of these factors
to be given equal weight to that of increased petroleum production,
they must be backed by a comprehensive national energy policy and
then, for each lease sale, they must be considered in a meaningful
impact assessment process.
Since Project Independence was launched in 1974, these two
parallel and competing concerns have governed our actions regarding
the OCS. The amended OCS Lands Act was one of the primary
indications that environmental protection was very much a concern of
the Congress and the public, even as DOI continued to implement
more ambitious leasing programs. At the beginning of each new
period of increased offshore leasing, critics have warned that a new,
accelerated and expanded Five-Year Schedule would mean that
environmental quality would be reduced unless appropriate
safeguards were established. According to Jeffrey Zinn of the
Congressional Research Service:
When the federal government attempted to implement
Project Independence by initiating offshore leasing in
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frontier areas and supporting other activities to increase
energy supplies that might affect the coast [public concern
rapidly escalated]. Oil and gas lease sales, proposed around
the entire marine coast, galvanized a strong, negative
response. A fear of the uncertain, coupled with the image of
recent oil spills, and the threat of indiscriminate industrial
development that would disrupt or destroy valued uses of the
coast precipitated a ground swell of public protest. The
federal government, pressing to initiate a new, more
aggressive lease policy, sought to alleviate those fears that
[they believed] were based on a combination of lack of
specific knowledge about energy activities and a fear of
possible irreversible impacts. . . . Everywhere the
protagonists were similar; promoters of rapid development
leading to greater energy self-sufficiency were opposed by
protectors of the coastal environment (Zinn 1980).
These protagonists are still competing for control of the OCS
leasing process ten years later. The arena for much of their competition
has been the EIA process and in particular the EISs that are produced
for each lease sale and Five-Year Leasing Schedule. In the following
section criticism of the current EIA processes for OCS leasing in
frontier areas is considered.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND
THE LEASE SALE PROCESS
The OCS Leasing Process
The sale of offshore leases to oil and gas companies is only one step in
the long process of extracting petroleum from the OCS. Figure I
illustrates some of the major steps in the current OCS decision-making
process and compares them to the steps used for leasing under the 1980
Schedule. The Summary of the Five-Year Lease Sale Schedule EISs
considers in detail the differences between the two processes. Below,
the generalized steps currently in effect are outlined (as described in the
1982 Five-Year Lease Schedule EIS, US Bureau of Land Management
1982). It should be noted that these are the "on-paper" procedures and
that in a number of cases they have not been followed as described.
I) Pre-Call Activities: Resource reports are compiled by the US
Geological Survey (USGS) for the whole federal offshore oil and gas
planning area being considered (Figures 2 and 3), including estimates
of recoverable resources and geohazard characterizations. 6 Upon
receipt of these reports, DOI begins writing the DEIS and the scoping
process begins. Scoping usually involves a set of meetings at which the
government officials of affected states, industry representatives,
environmental groups, and other interested parties discuss with DOI
their ideas and concerns about what should be considered in the EIS.7
Following the receipt of an exploration and development report
estimating the types and magnitudes of expected offshore activities,
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modeling studies are begun and the impact section of the EIS is
written.
2) Call for Information: "Industry [is] specifically asked to outline
broad areas within the planning area which they believe to have
hydrocarbon potential and which they may be interested in leasing. All
interested parties [are then] requested to comment on possible
environmental effects and use conflicts. Although the information
submitted to [MMS] [is] broader than what [was] submitted under the
[1980] process, it is expected that it will be useful in focusing the NEPA
document analysis on areas most likely to be developed and areas of
greatest concern." (US Bureau of Land Management 1982)
3) Area Identification: Portions of the lease sale area to be omitted from
the sale are formally announced and alternatives for the EIS are then
determined.8
4) NEPA Document Preparation: The DEIS should be filed with EPA
about eleven months after the Call for Information. Standard
alternatives of "delay" and "no-action" 9 are to be included and the EIS
is expected to "treat cumulative impacts . . . based on probable
resources which may be leased as a result of the sale in question, and..'.
consider the impacts of the development of all oil and gas resources in
the planning area and where appropriate other activities of relevance."
(US Bureau of Land Management 1982) EISs for second and third lease
sales in a leasing area are expected to be updates of the first EIS for that
area.
5) Stipulations: These mechanisms (e.g. not allowing drilling in Arctic
waters during whale migrations) for protecting sensitive resources are
to be developed throughout the EIA process and often cover problems
that DOI believes can be regulated by MMS operating orders.
6) Public Hearings: Along with scoping meetings, public hearings
represent the major opportunity for interested parties to influence the
EIA process. Hearings are supposed to be held 45 days following
release of the DEIS and usually in coastal cities near the proposed lease
area although for several recent sales these provisions have not been
followed (see below). The need for hearings on second offering EISs are
to be determined on a case-by-case basis (although this situation has
not yet occured).
7) Issuance of the FEIS and Proposed Notice of Sale (PNS): Based on
the FEIS, DOI issues a Secretarial Issue Document outlining the
proposed acreage to be allowed for lease.
8) Final Notice of Sale (FNS): Governors of affected states have 60 days
to comment on the PNS after which an FNS is published.
9) Sale and Bid Acceptance: A sale is held 30 days after the FNS is issued
and three months later acceptable bids are announced and leases are
issued.
Public Comment During the Lease Sale Process
It is the EIA portions of the lease sale process - scoping, comments on
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Figure I. A Comparison of the EIS Processes included in the 1982 and
1980 Five-Year Lease Schedules
Month 1982 Schedule 1980 Schedule
Resource Reports and Geology
Report
Begin EIS
Scoping
Exploration and Development
Report (E and D)
Socioeconomic and Oil
Spill Modeling
Impact Section of EIS
-12
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
E Release Draft EIS
M Public Hearings
F Final EIS/Prop. N.S.
Final Sale Notice
Sale
Resource Reports
C Call for Nominations
D Nominations Due
T Tract Selection
Scoping
Alternatives Defined
Resource and Infrastructure
Report
Socioeconomic and Oil
Spill Modeling
E Release Draft EIS
H Public Hearing
F Release RNAL
Proposed Notice of Sale
Final Sale Notice
Sale
19
C:
D
A
Call for Information
Information Due
Alternatives Defined
Area Selection
E and D Report for
Alternatives
Impacts of Alternatives
Source: US Bureau of Land Management 1982
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Figure 2. Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Planning Areas (Alternatives I
and IV) Source US Denrem -er-o,
Glofmemsee
Soure.. US Da nment of tI" In:meor
Figure 3: Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Planning Areas (Alternatives I
and IV)
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the DEIS, the public hearings and state comments on the PNS - which
provide the major opportunities for the public -environmental
groups, industry, state and local governments individuals - to express
their opinions about what should be leased and under what
conditions. Industry, as the lessee, and the states, under the terms of
OCSLAA, have additional opportunities to comment during post-
lease stages. However, many critics argue that once the lease is written,
there is a built-in momentum in favor of development which is very
difficult to overcome, even if new information or problems arise (Lee
1975).
Because the prelease period provides the only available forum
for public debate over offshore policies and actions, the rest of this
discussion is focused primarily on prelease EISs and their role in
decision making. (A detailed consideration of the role played by the
Five-Year Lease Schedule and a comparison of the current schedule
with its predecessor is provided in the Summary of the 1980 and 1982
Five-Year Schedules.)
Types of EISs
EISs have been written for different types of development related to
offshore oil and gas operations. By far the most common (and the most
contested) EISs have been those concerned with prelease sales for
specific sites. In recent years, DOI, industry and the public have
focused most of their attention on the EIA processes and documents for
sales in frontier areas (off the north Atlantic, central California and
Alaska coasts). EISs have also been produced to assess the impacts of
policies proposed in the Five-Year Lease Sale Schedules developed to
guide offshore leasing.'0
Leasing is considered a major federal action subject to NEPA,
and therefore, at the prelease stage, environmental impact assessment
has been performed exclusively by DOI. The OCSLAA also requires
that post-lease environmental assessments (EAs) be submitted by the
oil and gas companies prior to the development and production phases
of offshore operations and that a full EIS be prepared at least once prior
to production in previously undeveloped frontier areas. The OCSLAA
allows DOI to require an EIS for any industry exploration,
development or production plans if DOI believes that the EA
conducted by the company is insufficient or brings to light issues
which must be considered in more detail. To date, no exploration
phase EISs have been required by DOI, and since there have been no
commercially viable discoveries in frontier areas, there have been no
opportunities for EISs on later phases. Should a major discovery occur
in a frontier area, an EIS would be required, but whether development
or production EISs would be requested for subsequent discoveries in
the same area is difficult to predict.
In recent years, the petroleum industry has put a great deal of
emphasis on post-lease environmental assessments and has paid
relatively little attention to the prelease EIA process (Chamberlain
1984). Compared with other interested groups, industry submits
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relatively few letters of comment in response to the drafts of EISs. In the
view of some critics, industry has little to gain by critiquing EISs or
becoming deeply involved in scoping. These critics maintain that
since DOI is so clearly oriented towards expedited leasing, most DOI
decisions are likely to go industry's way regardless of any industry
input.
Petroleum industry personnel have a different view of the
reasons for their lack of involvement. They believe that most of the
substantive issues about the impacts of offshore activities were worked
out in the mid-1970s and that the prelease EIA process is merely a
statutory requirement that all parties must go through in order to get
on with leasing and then development. They point out that many
decisions about leasing have not gone their way and that the many
lawsuits and regulations have prevented rapid development of the
OCS (Chamberlain 1984).
QUALITY AND USEFULNESS OF SOME RECENT OFFSHORE
LEASING EISs
EISs Should Influence DOI's Decision Making
The decision to lease is, in large part, determined by factors
relating directly to the decision-making process. The
personalities and biases of the institutions and individuals
taking part in the process and the timing of their
involvement is central to the outcome of that process.
Another critical factor is the information base and the
capability of synthesizing that information. Finally, the goal
or purpose of the process itself is significant and becomes
the motivating factor in shaping its direction (Lee 1975).
As Director of the Massachusetts Energy Policy Office, Henry
Lee was critical of the OCS lease sale process at a time when accelerated
and expanded leasing was just beginning. His characterization of that
process, however, is no less correct a decade later. The goals of reducing
US dependence on imported oil and balancing expedited offshore
production with environmental protection have long been the focus of
federal leasing policy.
In the face of continual efforts to expand and accelerate leasing,
the prelease sale EIA process (and in particular the EISs which are its
central documents) has been the primary environmental protection
mechanism established by NEPA and OCSLAA. What EISs have been
able to contribute to the offshore leasing process is partly related to the
first three elements of Lee's equation - the people and institutions of
the process, the timing of their involvement, and the information base.
These factors are all important for producing the prelease sale EIS and
using it for making leasing decisions. In the final analysis, however,
the goals and purposes of the leasing process determine the
effectiveness of the EIA component. When there is a genuine concern
for balancing offshore energy production and environmental
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protection and when there is also a mechanism for genuine public
involvement in the process, EISs can contribute a great deal to effective
decision making.
Ideally, what should EIA and an EIS do? Lee has pointed out
that determining the quality of an EIA process is difficult because most
of the evidence must come only from the EIS. The conduct and content
of the process is troublesome to determine. He notes that "there is not
yet complete agreement about the criteria by which the quality of such
studies should be evaluated" (Lee 1983).
However, observers of the EIA process have suggested several
functions that NEPA-required EISs and EIA processes should fulfill
(Sax 1973, Orloff 1978). Applied to DOI and prelease sale EISs, these
become a set of objectives against which the problems and
accomplishments of recent offshore EIA processes can be measured. An
EIS should serve to:
" Increase DOI's reliance on the best scientific information and
methods of analysis;
* Warn about potential environmental problems;
' Alert the public to agency activity and provide mechanisms
for public involvement in decision making;
* Delay, modify or cancel projects or policies likely to cause
environmental harm; and as an outcome of these,
" Encourage a commitment to better acquisition and
interpretation of environmental data, to preparation of
meaningful and defensible EISs, and to open and sound
administrative decision making.
Selection of EISs for Review
Each of these objectives is examined below with attention to the
shortcomings and and successes specific to offshore oil and gas lease
sale EISs. My inferences and conclusions come primarily from a review
of five offshore EISs and comments by experts (Commentors) on these
EISs and the EIA processes by which the EISs were produced." The
literature on OCS leasing, letters and testimony given at EIS hearings,
as well as personal interviews provided supplementary information.
I looked closely at three EISs written by DOI for site-specific
offshore oil and gas lease sales in frontier areas and the two most recent
planning EISs written for proposed Five Year Lease Sale Schedules: 2
* North Atlantic (Georges Bank) Sale #42, 1977, including
Supplement, 1979 (one of the most controversial sales and the
subject of extensive litigation);
* Beaufort Sea Sale #BS, 1979 (representative of the process
followed for a joint state/federal lease sale);
* Central California Sale #73, 1983 (also very controversial,
represents one of the first area-wide leasing EISs written by
the Reagan/Watt DOI);
* 1980 and 1982 Five-Year Lease Sale Schedules, 1979 and 1982
(considered together because the 1982 Schedule EIS was a
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Supplement of the 1980 Schedule EIS and because the
documents provide an excellent way to consider the policy
differences between the Carter and Reagan Administrations).
Together, these EISs represent each of the major OCS frontier
areas in the US and the major program documents that guide leasing
policy. The EISs were produced between 1977 and 1983, covering the
time from the last year of the first period of expanded and accelerated
leasing (the year of major congressional debate over amending the
OCSLA) to the first years of the third period, the Reagan/Watt era of
streamlined leasing procedures and area-wide sales. By using this time
frame, changes in document focus and quality have been considered
along with the way the EISs have been used for decision making in
light of changing offshore policy.
Reasonable questions could certainly be raised about the
appropriateness of the EISs chosen for review." That would be true, no
matter which set of EISs was selected. My main concern has been with
the use of the EISs for decision making and only secondarily with the
evolution of the factual quality of the documents (although they-
certainly are related). In this respect, the EISs chosen for review were
appropriate because each of the EISs (in the form of summaries written
Lisa Berzok and myself and commented upon by this issue's
"Commentors") served to elicit information about how the EIA
process for offshore petroleum leasing operates. The Georges Bank
and Beaufort Sea EISs reflect the EIA process at a time prior to the
implementation of the streamlined leasing procedures and area-wide
sales, while the Central California EIS serves to highlight a very recent
EIS and its use. The Five-Year Lease Schedule EISs document the
transition between these two periods of OCS leasing.
Selection of Commentors
Commentors were selected from the letters printed in the Final EISs for
each sale, the literature on the offshore EIA process, and suggestions
from Commentors who had already been contacted. Appendix 1 lists
the Commentors who agreed to participate and their organizational
affiliation.
Considerable effort was made to ensure that each of the major
groups -environmentalists, industry, state/local government and
academia-was represented. This proved difficult. Over 120
invitations to participate were extended. However, many potential
Commentors felt they did not have the time or in some cases the
expertise to comment. Time was cited as a serious constraint for all,
except those from environmental groups. Industry representatives
were difficult to locate because they were not very active in the prelease
sale process during the time period being studied; furthermore a
number of those contacted reported that they would need to get either
concensus from a group of people within the company about their
comments or approval from company attorneys.
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In the discussion that follows, each Commentor is represented
by a number and in the text attributions are designated by that number
within square brackets (e.g. [5])." Appendix 2 lists the specific
questions asked of the Commentors.
Does DOI Rely on the Best
Scientific Information and
Methods of Analysis?
Some of the earliest criticisms of the EIA process focused on the types of
information used in EISs, the scientific quality and accuracy of that
information, and its usefulness for decision making. How DOI
chooses its data, how it determines which studies are to be done and
how it interprets the information in an EIS are strongly influenced by
the ongoing public debate over the mission of DOI (Clawson 1983, Sax
1973). A number of the problems discussed below have their
genesis ... [in] the inherent attitude within the leasing
agency that mineral exploration is a natural extension of
[human] use of the ocean and that the activity is benign in
effect on living resources. A more scientific approach would
focus on objective consideration of data. Where
environmental data may be insufficient, the possibility of
effects which are as yet not understood should be noted and
accommodated [11].
The Amount of Information Obscures More Than It Clarifies. White
(1972) was one of the first to warn both producers and critics of EISs
that a full description of impacts (especially for every alternative) is
clearly not possible nor desirable. EIS length has been a critical
problem in the US; the Trans Alaskan Pipeline EIS totaled .... pages
in .... volumes (Winder and Allen 1975). By 1978, the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) called for shorter EISs and suggesting
that "proposals of unusual scope or complexity shall normally be less
than 300 pages" (sec. 1502.7 Regulations for Implementing the
Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act,
1978).
The EISs reviewed for this work were of the following lengths:
* 1980 Five-Year Schedule - 380 pages plus appendices
* 1982 Five-Year Schedule - 890 pages plus appendices
* North Atlantic - 1,680 pages plus appendices
* Central California - 855 pages plus appendices
* Beaufort Sea - 280 pages plus appendices
The number of pages in these offshore EISs suggests, and most
of the parties involved agree that there is an enormous amount of paper
work involved in the EIA process. In many cases there is too much
information provided and much of it is redundant, unnecessarily
comprehensive or not useful (Sethi 1977, [9,10]).
This overabundance of information has several consequences.
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The OCS Technical Review Committees have complained that the size
of the EISs hides the failure by DOI to genuinely consider impacts
(Goldstein 1982). Douglas Foy, of the Conservation Law Foundation,
believes that:
Interior uses OCS EISs more as a shield from environmental
attack than as a legitimate decision making tool. The
encyclopedic or catalogue approach to EIS preparation is
intended to cover, albeit superficially, any possible claim
that the agency has failed to take environmental values into
account [2].
From a different perspective, the petroleum industry has argued that
[c]ompared to a reasonable mode, regulations governing oil
and gas extraction on the [OCS] are clearly excessive,
produce little quantitative benefit to society, and serve to
impede the development of badly needed domestic energy
supplies (Shirley n.d. as cited in Shirley 1982).
Obviously there is a great deal of information that must be
included in offshore EISs. The first step to making the information
accessible and useful would be to include several levels of summary in
the documents.
A second step, which in concept DOI has begun, would be to
write a series of area-wide or regional baseline information documents
to which later and more concise EISs could refer. In practice this would
only be of use if the authors of the documents adhered to several
conditions: concensus must be reached among participants in the EIA
process concerning the baseline "facts," the baseline documents must
not be written as EISs themselves, and there must be a clearly analytical
approach taken to the writing of the EISs in which alternative leasing
scenerios are critically compared.
The Most Up to Date Information Is Not Always in the EIS. While
having too much information can be a problem, a much more serious
deficiency is the lack of information critical to accurate and
meaningful analysis (Winder and Allen 1975). In many cases, studies
concerning the most up-to-date information on baseline conditions,
relevant past experience with similar projects and the most important
theoretical studies do not exist or are still in the process of being
conducted when needed. If the information does exist, it may
sometimes not be available to the preparers of offshore EISs [11].
Commentors from academia pointed out that in a number of
cases the information exists and is available, but EIS preparers do not
attempt to include it. This was cited particularly for Georges Bank #42
where studies of the Argo Merchant and Florida oil spills were not used
in any meaningful way in the EIS [7,9].
In contrast, Susan Bolton [11] suggests that the primary
difficulty for EIS preparers in DOI is that the preparers and the OCS
Environmental Studies Program are not well coordinated. The
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preparers "often do not have final data or published documents
available during the development of the draft EIS or, in many
instances, when finalizing the document."
For environmentalists and representatives of state and local
governments, the tendency for DOI to go ahead with leasing in the face
of substantial uncertainty and missing information is a serious
problem with the current system [4,14].
Time and again the EIS admits that the environmental
information on major aspects of the analysis is extremely
limited. Rather than seriously face the consequences of this
limitation, however, they simply proceed utilizing the
limited information available [14].
There will probably never be enough information about some
leasing areas or to satisfy some critics. For each individual lease sale,
however, ther is no excuse for omitting studies that bear on specific
sites or resources at risk. Whether a sale should be delayed so that
relevant but incomplete studies can be taken into account should be
given more careful consideration. Perhaps the lease sale schedule could
bd revised to more closely coincide with the completion dates
scheduled for OCS Environmental Studies Program research.-
Factual Errors Are Common but Probably Declining. Factual errors
certainly occur in EISs, but it is not clear how pervasive these errors are,
whether there has been improvement in accuracy over the last few years
and how detrimental the errors are to decision making. Many of our
Commentors indicated that they found numerous errors in the EISs
[1,2,4,6,7,9,14,16]. However, the importance of these errors is much
more difficult to assess. One academic Commentor [6], while agreeing
that some errors existed in the Beaufort Sea EIS, indicated that they
were not major errors. A state planner [12] made the important point
that
[t]he question about accuracy of the [Georges Bank] EIS
misses the mark. The EIS was generally consistent with
scientific information existing at the time. The problem was
that the existing information tended to be fairly poor and
that the EIS was not particularly effective at summarizing
this information for decision making. [12].
Over the past few years, DOI has improved its data base
considerably concerning specific sites and resources. Although good
information on actual spills remains limited, the OCS Environmental
Studies Program has sponsored a great deal of research, baseline
studies of potential spill areas have been conducted by state and federal
agencies and there are many independent scientists conducting
research on topics related to the impacts of oil (albeit at relatively
meager levels of funding).
Unfortunately, whether the information as presented in the
EISs is "correct" or not is often a matter of interpretation. There
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remain large disagreements between DOI, the oil industry and
segments of the academic community over what the facts are about oil
pollution. These disagreements are likely to be solved only when the
lease sale process includes much broader and more meaningful
mechanisms for these groups to come together to debate the available
data. This has begun to a limited degree in the form of the biological
monitoring groups that have been set up for certain areas (such as
Georges Bank) but will probably not yield very satisfactory results
until adequate levels of financing are provided for the participants.
Generalized or Outdated Estimates Are Too Common. When
important information is not available or is difficult or expensive to
obtain, a serious dilemma results: in the interest of making predictive
environmental assessments, figures or estimates derived from other
locations and situations must be used. There is a tendency to rely on
"conventional wisdom" or "universal data" when site specific data are
not available (White 1972). Several commentors complained that the
information used to assess impacts and construct models was of limited
value because of its origin or its age [2,9,14]:
Most of the EISs consist of hundreds of pages of boilerplate;
if one reads a Gulf of Mexico EIS, its similarity to the
Georges Bank EIS is striking. Much of the language is
literally identical [2].
It is very difficult to draw inferences about a particular site or
resource based on information gathered from a different place or for a
different organism or social group. The same animal may behave
differently in colder water, effects on the economy may be less where
there is more infrastructure in place, the type of oil varies from one
experiment to the next. Still for estimating the impacts of oil and gas
development, generalized data is widespread because we are faced with
many important questions and only limited funds with which to
determine the answers.
Clearly more money should be spent to consider a whole range
of problems such as the effects of drilling muds, baseline studies of
likely spill sites and the effects of boom-bust cycles on small towns. But
there will never be enough funds. What is really at issue is the
credibility of the data and analyses that are transferred. Not enough
care is taken by EIS authors to discuss the limitations of such transfers,
to describe the different interpretations that are possible, and to be
candide about the remaining uncertainty. In addition, the authors
must be willing to say, when appropriate, that the transfers are not
sufficient and that a sale cannot proceed until an acceptable level of
uncertainty is attained by site or resource specific research.
Of the EISs I reviewed, none were really suited for a direct
comparison since they were so geographically distinct. Nevertheless, I
found that the discussions were very similar, partly because of the
standard EIS format followed, but more importantly because of the
failure to attempt any analysis of the proposed alternatives (see below).
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This lack of analysis leaves the documents primarily as listings of the
known information about oil, discharges, onshore impacts and other
factors.
Use of Estimates Indicating Less Dramatic Impacts Is Now the Policy.
The basic format of these EISs is to describe the likelihood of
finding various quantities of oil or gas as "high," "medium" and
"low" case scenarios and the use of these levels for analysis. "Best,"
"moderate" and "worst" case oil spill scenarios are also developed
based statistically on the amount of oil and gas anticipated.
In both the Beaufort Sea and Georges Bank EISs, worst case oil
spill scenarios were outlined and discussed. In spite of this, critics of
both EISs questioned whether the estimates used were sufficiently
pessimistic and whether the precision suggested by the models
employed was warranted [2,4,6,9,10,14,15].
Intermediate case (also known as conditional mean) estimates
of recoverable resources were used in the Beaufort Sea EIS in a
departure from previous practice which had based analysis on the
maximum amounts of petroleum expected from a lease area. This
meant that the probabilities that various impacts would occur were
more realistic. At the same time it reduced the estimated liklihood that
oil spills and other impacts would occur at all.
The streamlined procedures implemented by the Reagan
Administration have resulted in an even more conservative approach
to estimating impacts. "Risked" conditional mean estimates of the
commercially recoverable resources are now used. "Such figures have
the risk of not finding hydrocarbon resources in the leasing area
factored into the calculations. This usually reduces [even further] the
size of the resource estimate . .. and consequently reduces all other
estimates calculated from the resource levels. .. [I]f the risk of not
finding hydrocarbon resources in an area is very high, the estimate of
total resources, development and possible oilspills will be reduced
substantially" (US Bureau of Land Management 1982).
In the trend described above, there was clearly a sharp dividing
line. In the first two cases, oil spill probabilities were based on the
assumption that oil would be found and that impact assessment
should be based on the amount of production expected. However, it is
not very meaningful to take the next step of including a factor for the
probability of not finding any oil. Broadly speaking, if no oil is found,
there will be few impacts. But if oil (or gas) is found, the impacts will
bear some relationship to the amount discovered (which will
determine such factors as the number of wells, kilometers of pipeline,
service bases and employees) and the impact analysis should be based
on this. While perhaps statistically correct for considering the entire
lease period, "risked" estimates tend to reduce the reported probability
of impacts for the development and production phases. It would be
appropriate for different probability scenarios for different phases to
be outlined in the EISs.
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Accuracy of Forecasting Models Seems Variable in Practice. The
models used to predict the fate and effects of spilled oil, chronic
operational discharges, air pollution and estimates of spill clean up
technology, are difficult to test in the field. Oil spill models are rarely
tested in the field due to the (fortunate) rarity of spills. Chronic
discharges are difficult to model because of the complexity of currents
and wind and because of the relatively low rate of discharge and small
concentrations of toxins.
The oil spill models used for the Beaufort Sea EIS were
considered to have been relatively good given the state of knowledge at
the time [6]. The Georges Bank models received a test when the Argo
Merchant spilled 28,000 tons of No. 6 fuel oil in 1976, and observers'
perceptions of the results illustrate some of the problems of
interpreting and using information. One of the nonscientist
Commentors indicated- that the behavior of the slick corresponded
reletively accurately to the modelled prediction. A scientist
Commentor, however, strongly dissagrees with this interpretation,
suggesting that the models did not show good predictive ability [7].
Other Commentors on the California and Georges Bank EISs
suggested that oil spill modelling relied on information that was
lacking or far too imprecise [2,9,14].
Oil spill probabilities and trajectory models, while quite
impressive in their content, did not address fully the
problems of the Arctic environment. . . The low probability
of oil spills was too optimistic and relied far too much on
conditions [in the Gulf of Mexico] that do not exist in the
Arctic. .. Particularly lacking was a realistic worst case
analysis [of] the possible impacts on Arctic species [ 10].
Modelling of cleanup capability has generally been accurate in
the EISs [6,12], but often presented in ways that obscure its practical
limitations [2,7].
Estimates of Ecosystem Resiliency and Cumulative Impacts Have
Little Scientific Basis. Analyisis of the effects of offshore activities over
time is essential.
Without a sound scientific basis for decision making about
environmental effects, it is not possible to conclude whether
the technology now in use to control discharges provides
adequately for the safety [to the environment] of OCS
operations. The leasing program of the Department of the
Interior is not structured to establish that scientific basis in a
timely fashion (US National Academy of Sciences 1981 as
cited in Hileman 1981).
None of the EISs reviewed does a very good job of answering
whether there should be leasing in a particular place and if so under
what conditions. This has been one of the most serious and consistent
failures of EISs since NEPA was signed (Winder and Allen 1975).
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At the center of any such analysis should be consideration of the
resiliency of the affected ecosystems in the face of both chronic and
large accidental discharges and the cumulative effects of multiple
waves of leasing and associated development. All of the EISs reviewed
were weak in these areas [2,4,6,7,9,11]. A Commentor on the central
California lease sale observed:
The FEIS discussion of cumulative impacts should be noted
for its lack of adequacy in providing background to assess
the real expected offshore and onshore impacts resulting
[from] cumulative sales. For example, the loss of wetlands
expected from a proposed Exxon oil jacket assembly area in
Humboldt County could not have been predicted from
reading the EIS on Sale 53, further to the south, which has
provided the need for the development. Such information
critical for overall decision making continues to be lacking
in OCS EISs [4].
For many of the leasing areas, cumulative impacts are likely to
be the most serious problems resulting from offshore activities. Too
of ten site specific EISs do not look carefully enough at the the proposed
project in context with past activities and projects anticipated for the
future. DOI's efforts to develop sets of information for each planning
area represents a good first step, but the information will be of little use
if the planning process does not wait for the information to be
obtained. There must also be a better recognition of the uncertainty
that is inevitable when discussing predictions of cumulative effects.
Allowances should be made in planning to account for the possible
errors in prediction. The most appropriate time to include these
considerations is during deliberations on the Five-Year Schedules.
Do the EISs Provide Warnings about
Potential Environmental Problems?
Warnings in an EIS about potential environmental problems should
be embodied in the consideration of alternatives for different types and
degrees of development and in the discussions of the impacts that
might result from these different impacts and the likelihood that these
impacts will occur.
A lternatives Are Not Often Genuinely Different Nor Are They Given
Equal Analysis. In a major review of EISs Winder and Allen (1975)
considered alternatives to be the most important element of an EIS
analysis. Yet they are consistantly not formulated well. A common
problem with EISs is that there is often an unreasonable exclusion of
obvious alternatives (deviations from the main proposal and others in
completely different categories), sometimes due to the perceived
narrowness of the decsion-making agency's mandate, funding
restrictions, or for reasons of politics (Orloff 1978). The alternatives
considered in all the offshore oil and gas EISs were generally very
narrow, except for the required "no-action" alternative. It was not
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possible to tell by the documents whether other alternatives were
simply not considered or whether they were dropped prior to the
writing of the EIS during the scoping and agency consultation
sessions.
In every offshore EIS there was an overriding assumption that
the main proposal was the "best" and that each of the other alternatives
should be compared to the main proposal. In none of the EISs I
reviewed did the the alternatives to the main proposal receive an equal
analysis. In some ways this is not surprising, since for the most part
these alternatives were different from the main proposal only in degree
but not in kind. Early reviewers of EISs were concerned that
preconceived outcomes would be commonplace (Gillette 1972) and in
the opinion of our Commentors, this has been the case for offshore
petroleum EISs.
Some observers have suggested that better consideration of
alternatives might occur during the development of EISs for policy
plans like the Five-Year Lease Sale Schedules (Chatzimikes 1982).
However, while the Five-Year Schedule EISs did consider more
genuinely different alternatives than did the site specific EISs, they did
not do so in a way that considered alternatives (such as delaying leasing
in certain lease areas, relying on conservation and other energy sources,
deleting specific lease sales from the schedule) on an equal basis with
the proposed schedule or procedures. Furthermore, there are
indications that DOI does not take even the primary alternative in the
FEIS very seriously. The final Five-Year Leasing Schedule that was
adopted in 1982 was not even mentioned as an alternative in the FEIS
printed for that schedule.
Whether or not a project or program is needed is rarely
-considered in EISs (Elkington 1978). As we have seen, for offshore oil
and gas leasing need is assumed. The need for drilling was considered
briefly in the Five-Year Schedule EISs within a discussion of an
alternative that involved other energy sources and conservation. There
are some who believe a more extensive treatment of these alternatives is
needed.
The need to compare alternatives is valid not only for
specific geographic regions, but also for resources. Here we
return to the complex trade offs between ocean development
and land development. Many people seem to look upon our
ocean as the "last great frontier," which is a very romantic
and exciting concept until one remembers the fate of the
preceeding last frontier. Is the United States better off
concentrating its efforts in drilling for oil on the [outer]
continental shelf or should the United States place the
burden of meeting its energy needs upon oil imports or coal?
The answer to this question will be complicated, . . .
[h]owever it is vital that the ocean-land trade offs be assessed
(Lee 1975).
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There Does Not Appear to Be a Willingness to Consider New
A lternatives Throughout the EJA Process. One intent of N EPA was for
alternatives to be developed and examined sufficiently early in the
process to allow agency and public response (Liroff 1976).
Practitioners have seen that in order for the alternatives to be
meaningful they must emerge from a continuous process of problem
definition, formulation of alternatives, environmental assessment and
data evaluation followed by possible reformulation of the problem and
perhaps new alternatives, and so on (Ortolano 1973 as cited in Andrews
1973 and Herr 1984). Institutionalization of scoping is one step toward
ensuring that some portion .of this process will occur for offshore
leasing decisions. By itself, however, it cannot ensure that problems are
considered from several points of view and reconsidered when new
facts or interpretations result from the first steps of the process.
Observers of the EIS process have suggested that in order for
reiteration to occur, the agency must be willing to include in the
analysis alternatives brought out during scoping, at public hearings
on the DEIS, and from agency review of the proposals (Krieth 1973,
Sachs and Clark 1981). However, there is no such willingness apparent
in the EIA processes being conducted for offshore oil and gas leasing.
The Potential Severity of Impacts is Not Well Described in the EISs.
The EISs correctly emphasize that large accidental oil spills are a
relative rarity. However, the problems with the factual and analytical
content of these documents described above combine to obscure a
realistic picture of the likely effects of oil spills that might occur in any
given area. In addition, only limited attention has been paid to the
sensitivity of the predictions made. In the EISs we considered, only
spill and accident data from 1970 onward are used. This has the effect
of eliminating the Santa Barbara spill and severely reduces the
estimated likelihood of the of large spills predicted. In addition,
reliable information from North Sea drilling is not used. While there
may be good reasons for not using these figures (examples might be
that spill prevention devices are much better now than in 1969, drilling
in the North Sea is of a different and not comparable type, etc.), the
failure to discuss the reasons for not using them leaves the impression
that the only purpose was to decrease the estimate of the number of
likely spills.
There is also little direct consideration given to the concern of
town and rural residents along the potentially affected coastlines. The
relative weakness of the social impact assessment sections of these EISs
is of serious concern to some critics [7,10].
Is the Public Being Alerted to DOI Activity and Provided Mechanisms
for Involvement in Decision Making?
Participants Now Have Less Access to the EJA Process. For both
Georges Bank and the Beaufort Sea EISs, there were considerable
opportunities for public involvement within the framework of the
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hearings and comment periods established by CEQ requirements and
OCSLAA. In these two cases, interest groups were specifically invited
to participate in the process (Beaufort) or encouraged to do so by the
timeliness and location of the hearings in coastal cities and towns
(both)[5], and by wide dissemination of the EISs [3,5,6,10]. These
meetings and hearings were seen by some as important forums for
debate over OCS leasing policy [6,9]. Others have pointed out that
while the sixty-day comment period might have been sufficient for
EISs of the length recommended by CEQ (150-300 pages), for volumes
as large and complex as these two, more time was needed to read and
digest all the material [10,11]. The quality and format of the
documents may also have deterred some from participating.
In line with industry's perspective that agency meetings and
public hearings are too numerous and sometimes repetitive (Sethi
1977), the Reagan administration has instituted new streamlined
leasing procedures (described above), eliminating several
opportunities for public or agency review. The result has been a
serious erosion of opportunities for public involvement in the lease
sale EIA process. To begin with, the comment period on the first
proposal for a new Five-Year Lease Schedule closed very soon after the
DEIS was released (the proposal for a new schedule and the DEIS
outlining the potential impacts of the proposal were separate
documents), thus limiting public debate [1]. Next, in both California
(Sale #73) and New England (Sale #82) only single hearings were held,
and these were in locations far removed from the coastal communities
likely to be most affected by leasing [4,5,9,14,15]. In California,
scoping meetings were abandoned in favor of written scoping
comments, and the streamlined procedures reduced the comment
period from 60 to 45 days [4]. The result was to make this sale even more
controversial than it might have been [14,15]. One Commentor noted
that -
The preparation of the EIS for Lease Sale #73 appears to
have represented a step backward by the Department of
Interior in terms of public participation. . . Not only did the
EIS suffer as a result of this, but there was increased conflict
over the draft EIS as excluded groups and individuals raised
issues and concerns which more appropriately should have
been raised during the scoping process. . . Overall, public
participation was minimized throughout the process by
[DOI] as much as possible. [14].
Such an approach, which tends to exclude participation by
affected groups, can only serve to add delay to the leasing process, not
make it faster as DOI would like. Until those affected parties are given
meaningful roles in the process and have their ideas and concerns
addressed seriously, they will continue to oppose offshore activities
based as much on the perceived and real inequities of the system as on
the merits of any given proposal.
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Opportunities for Post-Lease Sale Participation Are Limited. Like the
prelease process, there are structured mechanisms for including public
input in postlease procedures, and while participants have mixed
views of how well these mechanisms operate, most Commentors who
discussed postlease participation indicated that opportunities were
limited [2,5,7,10,13]. In Alaska, one Commentor reports that
"[n]egotiation by all concerned groups have in different ways and
measure affected post-lease sale exploration and/or development
permit stipulations" [6]. However, another participant notes that the
local government adjacent to the Beaufort Sea lease area, the North
Slope Borough, was not invited to be on the state/federal Biological
Task Force set up there, and it was some time before even an ex officio
membership could be obtained [10].
In California the major "avenue which has been open to
concerned groups and individuals to influence post lease sale
exploration and development activities has not been with the DOI,
but, rather, with the California Coastal Commission" [14].
It is very difficult for most organizations and all individuals
to influence post-lease activities. At that stage, matters '
become a war of attrition, and federal agencies can always
win such wars. With no fewer than three major federal
actors (Interior, NOAA, EPA), endless meetings of
supervisory committees (Biological Task Force, Scientific
Advisory Board, OCS Advisory Board), and industry reports
shielded by claims of proprietary information, one needs a
road map, a full time staff, and no other employment to
follow OCS regulation post lease [2].
Even being on one of these committees does not necessarily help
ensure participation.
The Biological Task Force has been very good about giving
any interested scientist an opportunity to contribute to the
design of the monitoring study which has accompanied
exploration [on Georges Bank]. Even here there is a problem
though. To truly have had an impact on the design of the
stud y, one would have had to go to countless long planning
sessions, and this would have had to have been done on a
volunteer basis. Few scientists can afford this sort of
conmittment without financial support. Perhaps the DOI
should fund outside, independent scientists to participate in
the design, evaluation, and review of their programs [7].
Finally, some observers believe that the quality of public
involvement is seriously reduced from the very start of the process
because many key decisions are made prior to the beginning of public
participation. In the case of the Georges Bank sale:
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[slince the EIS is largely a post facto rationalization, the
involvement of concerned observers is, by definition,
inadequate. The decision to lease had been made-
implicitly - long before the EIS was published. The actual
formulation of the EIS was exclusively an agency function,
with no outside comment allowed [2].
The Graphic Presentation of the EISs Usually Fails to Inform. The
EISs for the Georges Bank and Beaufort Sea lease sales were of only
limited graphic quality. The Georges Bank EIS had no auxilliary
maps and the maps within the text were not very readable. There were
few illustrative figures augmenting the text and some of those that
were included were difficult to understand. The Beaufort Sea EIS maps
were of good visual quality, but in some cases detail implied by the text
was missing from the map or the scale of the map reduced its
usefulness. The more recent Central California EIS was accompanied
by excellent maps, but these too suffered from problems of scale. This
was caused in part by a last minute shift in the emphasis of the analysis
from the larger area-wide leasing originally proposed to a much
smaller area encompassing only the Santa Maria basin. Several of the
figures and maps in the text had very poor labeling which reduced their
usefulness.
Comprehensive and Easy to Read Summaries are Needed. For residents
of coastal communities, many of whom do not have a technical
background, the major barrier to effective criticism is understanding
what is in the EIS. This problem is sometimes compounded by
language differences.
The preparers of the [Beaufort Sea] EIS expected people ([in
particular the] Inupiat) to read through their massive
document and comment on it; they made no attempt to
provide a concise summary of the major elements of the EIS
for the people most likely to be affected by the proposed
action ([the summary should) preferably [be] in Inupiat-
the local language) [10].
Only the most recent EISs have included summaries as a way to
aid readers, and in general these summaries have been too brief to be
very informative.
Both the graphic presentation and informative summaries are
critical to providing information to the public in ways that are useful.
The failure to include such simple devices leaves the public less
informed, makes it difficult for them to become informed and results in
the perception that DOI does not want them to be familiar with the
proposals and the possible impacts. Whether this perception is correct
or not, it tends to reinforce the belief that litigation is the only avenue
available for bringing their concerns into the decision-making process.
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Relations between Federal and State Governments over Offshore
Activities are Strained. The reaction of a state to federal policies and
actions often depends on the degree to which the state is likely to
benefit or be harmed. Although there is a tendency for states to
accommodate each other and downplay their differences in order to
provide a common front against the federal government (White 1972),
this has not always been the case in offshore leasing in frontier areas. In
New England, Massachusetts and Maine have often taken the lead in
opposing aspects of proposed drilling for Georges Bank, while New
Hampshire and Rhode Island have generally looked with more favor at
leasing in their waters. Although there has been little public or state
opposition to petroleum activities in the Gulf of Mexico, Florida has
been concerned about the possibilities of leasing in the frontier areas
on both of its coasts. Public opinion in California seems decidedly
opposed to extensive leasing north of the established Santa Barbara
fields, whereas Alaskans are sharply divided over the leasing of OCS
lands in that state.
The OCSLAA provides states with a number of opportunities to
conment on steps of the leasing process, through coordination and
consultation procedures with Governors, establishment of oil spill and
fishing contingency funds, grants to affected states, as well as scoping
processes and comments on draft EISs. Overseeing this work is the
OCS Advisory Board (originally formed as the Intergovernmental
Planning Program within Bureau of Land Management, now within
MMS) to provide states with greater access to the planning process
through membership on policy and scientific committees. The
Biological Task Forces described above for Alaska and New England
are examples of Federal/State cooperative committees that have been
formed to work out monitoring programs and to provide avenues for
discussion of technical issues [7,10].
In practice, there has been little opportunity for states to
intervene in the decision making for the federal OCS. In the OCSLAA
there is no provision giving them veto power over tract selection
(Kaplan 1982), and DOI has taken the position that within the context
of the OCS committees, states are limited to commenting on federal
proposals. For the most part, the streamlining procedures instituted by
the Reagan administration have been viewed by states as usurping the
little power of intervention that they had been granted through
OCSLAA (Goldstein 1982).
The Supreme Court has recently ruled Secretary Andrus vs.
California that federal activities, and in particular DOI offshore
leasing, is not required to show consistency with state Coastal Zone
Management (CZM) plans. It argued that leasing, in and of itself, was
not detrimental to the coast and that sufficient opportunities exist for
state input in the post lease phases. Critics have charged that this
ruling leaves states unable to provide meaningful evaluation and
response to cumulative sales [7,14].
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Legislation is now being considered in Congress which would
reinstate the requirement that leasing be subject to state CZM plans. In
the meantime, there is some evidence that the postsale permitting
process has provided some limited but genuine opportunities for the
states to have input (through the Biological Task Forces, for example)
and gives an indication that the two governmental interests can work
together (Colgan 1982). In addition:
In August, 1983, the OCS Policy Committee passed a
resolution at a meeting in Alaska requesting DOI to provide
states and Policy Committee members the opportunity to
comment on the annual review of the 5-Year Leasing
Schedule. The first annual review of the 1982 Schedule was
completed in July 1983. However, DOI agreed to furnish
states with a copy of that review and to advise interested
parties of the schedule of the next review. This should allow
affected states the opportunity to supply comments as
appropriate [13].
Unfortunately, these expressions of limited optimism by some state
representatives are not echoed by their colleagues in California who
believe that state/federal relations have reached an all-time low [14,15].
Are Projects or Policies Likely to Cause Environmental Harm
Delayed, Modified or Canceled?
Comments on the DEIS are Rarely Incorportated into the FEIS in a
Significant Way. Perhaps the primary opportunity for public input to
the offshore leasing EIA process is in written or oral comments on the
DEIS. Ideally the comments received during this period are taken into
- account during the production of the FEIS and included in making the
final decision on leasing. Each of the EISs we reviewed contained
sections which reproduced the written comments (although
particularly long comments, especially those from federal agencies
have only their cover letter or summary included [13]) and indications
as to the response provided in the FEIS. Our review indicates that few
of the substantative comments to the DEIS are incorporated into the
FEIS and this is corroborated by almost every one of our Commentors.
The Final [Central California] EIS, then, does not appear to
have been significantly changed as a result of the written
comments received. . . In most cases, the Final EIS repeated
what had been said about the issue in the Draft EIS or
referred the reader to another section where the Draft's
rationale was repeated (14].
Oral testimony generally fared even worse, since unless the
witness supplied a written draft there is no indication that their views
were taken into account [2,7,9,14].
No one who has ever attended one of these marathon events
(testimony often runs all day for days on end) can actually
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believe that the hearing panel listens and digests all or even
a significant part of the testimony. And I cannot believe that
anyone ever reads the transcripts [2].
Tract Selection and Mitigation Aleasures are Little Influenced by EISs.
For many of the reasons detailed in the sections above, the EIA process
appears to have almost no effect on determining tract selections,
stipulations or mitigation measures. These elements are much more
likely to be affected by litigation and state/federal politics in the
opinion of most of our Commentors [2,9,10,14,15]. However, one
Commentor pointed out that
the EIS is much more a political than a scientific document
and [it] is the EIS "process" rather than the actual document
per se that affected the Beaufort Sea lease sale. The "process"
signalled to the government, communities, and interested
public sectors (Inupiat and environmental) what Interior
intended to do. The "process" changed ideas on lease tracts
offered [and] caused a broadened dialogue within the oil and
gas industry and [with the other actors] [6].
The Effects of the EIA Process on Leasing Decisions are Very.Limited.
Early reviewers of EISs were very concerned that the EIA process would
have little effect on decisions because the outcome would be
predetermined by the implementing agency (Krieth 1973, White 1972).
For offshore oil and gas lease sales this seems to have been the case.
Throughout the preceding review of the lease sale process I have
shown instances in which a particular part of the process or EIS was
diminished in its effect by the fact that decisions to lease in new areas,
implement certain mitigation measures, lease a specific set of tracts, or
utilize particular technologies have in many cases been predetermined
by DOI. For some of our Commentors, specific inadequacies of the EIA
process are mostly not important given that so much of the decision
making goes on prior to or outside of public involvement in the
process.
In my opinion, Interior has no intention -long before it
prepares the EIS-of considering any alternatives to a full-
scale leasing program. The EIS is used largely as a post-
facto rationalization for a decision already made. The
problems with EISs are therefore much deeper than either
the quality of their analysis or the level of their detail. The
problems are systematic and go to the very heart of the
bureaucratic attitudes in Interior regarding its mission.
Interior considers its primary justification in life (as far as
BLA, now MMS is concerned) to be one of leasing mining
lands. Fishery protection is an inconvenient burden imposed
on the agency by Congress, but not a responsibility that
arises-in the agency's view-to equal importance with
mining [2].
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While it is encouraging that in some instances the process has
worked to incorporate reccommendations from affected groups, it
should also be obvious that for many the process is simply not open
enough. The belief that DOI makes leasing decisions before the EIA
process begins is widely held and many of the parties involved are
convinced that their comments are not adequately considered. The
current situation of almost assured and protracted litigation demands
a major change in our approach to making leasing decisions.
Many of the parties (including industry) begin with the
assumption that there will be litigation; it has almost become an
accepted part of the process. As a result this is an appropriate time to
consider changing the decision making format for leasing. The
participants already accept an adversarial "debate" over the issues
through both scoping and the legal challenges to the EISs, but they are
not anxious to continue the time delays and costs of litigation. Instead,
a system should be put into place which intentionally provides for
debates among participants, supports each to develop and research
leasing alternatives and provides mechanisms for negotiating
compromises among the debaters over major points of disagreement.
One possible framework for such a system of "intervenor detates" is
outlined in the next section.
HOW CAN THE OFFSHORE EIA PROCESS BE IMPROVED?
Improving Data Acquisition and Interpretation, EIS Preparation
and Open Decision Making
The questions I have posed above suggest the important role that EISs
can play. The criticisms presented in this review of several recent EISs
suggest at least several responses to these questions. The conclusions
reached in this review indicate that the past commitment of the
Department of Interior to developing a scientifically sound and open
EIA process must be called into serious question. While it is possible
that some of my conclusions are too critical of current offshore EIA
practice and not positive enough about its achievements, it is clear that
from the point of view of environmental advocates, representatives of
state and local governements, and academic scientists that the current
process leaves much to be desired. (To a degree, industry is also
unhappy with the current situation albeit for different reasons.)
The most serious charge made against the current system is that
many, if not most, of the major decisions about offshore oil and gas
leasing are determined before the EIA process can yield adequate
information and realistic comparisons of alternatives. Some decisions
occur without adequate public input because the internal DOI
decision making process not open to public review. For example, the
"program decision option document" for lease sale #42 was secret and
did not take adequate account of the material contained in the FEIS.
Friends of the Earth sued DOI to make the document public [7].
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Other difficulties stem from DOI's view of itself as a promoter of
oil and gas exploration. DOI has not been committed to providing,
through EIS and EIA processes, the types of information that
interested parties believe they need, or a form that they find useful.
This should be of major concern to DOI in view of the near certainty
that some of these parties will sue the agency for what they see as
failures in the EIA process. It should also be of concern to the public
because DOI is investing substantial tax revenue in in defending
against what they (and industry) see as attacks (Bardach and Pugliarese
1977).
Some observers of the EIA process believe that an agency's
commitment to good decision making needs to be based on adherence
to a set of standards of professional practice or to "good" (objective)
science (Sax 1973). DOI believes that it is relying on good science and is
professional in its practice, but as O'Hare (1980) has pointed out, good
science and professionalism are simply not enough.
Appeal to an expert evaluation, or trust in an "objective"
impact statement [by DOI], is grounded in the expectation
that the resulting study will be perceived as objective, and
treated as objective, by the participants in the debate.
[However, this] expectation is confounded so universally
that I can propose a general principle exactly contrary:
There is no report or study on a controversial matter that
will be used by the participants in debate as though it were
objective (O'Hare 1980).
DOI must recognize that few of the participants in the offshore
EIA process will regard a DOI-produced EIS as objective, no matter
how accurate or politically neutral the agency has attempted to make
it.
Some of DOI's problems may also be intrinsic to the "supply-
side" approach they take to ensuring that the "right" information is
provided to interested parties (the information consumers). Stewart
and Gelberd (1976) have shown that public officials are not very good
at predicting what information interested parties are likely to want or
what their interpretations of that information are likely to be, a
situation that scoping, properly instituted, was designed to alleviate
(Sachs and Clark 1981). O'Hare argues that since the officials must
essentially guess at what the interested parties might want to know and
because officials believe they must guard against subsequent
litigation, agencies tend to provide too much information in an EIS.
However, this strategy does not work because, as we have seen above,
the reaction of people confronted with poor data or with too much
data, poorly presented, is to throw up their hands or to sue. These are
the very outcomes that DOI should try to avoid.
In summary, there is strong evidence that DOI is making key
decisions prior to the EIA process without adequate public input. It is
clear that there is too much of the wrong kinds of data being presented,
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often poorly, a situation which interferes with public participation.
DOI must recognize that participants in the public process are not
going to view a DOI-produced EIS as objective. For these reasons it
may be intrinsically self defeating for DOI to be the sole or principal
agent to decide what information should be in the EIS. Still, before we
consider how to improve the offshore oil and gas leasing EIA process,
we need to consider some of the constraints within which DOI must
operate.
Constraints on DOI that Must Be Taken Into Account
The reason that Congress has delegated to DOI the responsibility for
leasing, just as we have delegated many decisions to other
governmental regulatory agencies, is that there are so many effects
from so many projects that no set of individuals can be fully or even
equally informed about all of them. Indeed, the consequences for each
of us from most projects are usually quite small (O'Hare 1980). Thus,
few of us have reason to pay close attention to most projects. Those
who believe that their self interest is in some way tied to a regional
interest must rely on state or local governments or environmental
groups to represent them. Therefore, any system which to reform the
EIA process for offshore petroleum leasing will have to be built around
the existing actors, DOI, state and local governments, the petroleum
industry, and environmental groups.
Furthermore, although DOI may be permanently in place as the
principal of an EIA process intended to inform the public and produce
environmentally sound decisions, DOI is also part of a very large
hierarchical bureaucracy that imposes its own limits on the ideal
process (Flamm 1973). Within this hierarchy, DOI is near the top as
one of the largest federal agencies and, after the Internal Revenue
Service, the largest producer of revenue for the federal treasury. Its
central position in the leasing process is also not likely to change.
When considering how to change the EIA process to produce
better and fairer decisions, the most crucial component to any reform
package is the manner in which alternatives are determined. There are
several constraints on the specification of the alternatives. The EIA
process must concern itself with alternatives that the deciding agency
can control (since the agency decision makers often cannot wait for
other agencies or groups outside their control to give input or make
decisions. Alternatives that are chosen for debate must have a
reasonable probability of being financially and politically
implementable. The alternatives chosen must not alienate allies of
DOI since they will be needed on other issues at other times (Sax 1973).
Finally, any new process must not create further delay. Oil
companies once saw EIA as a way to reduce delay (Elkington 1978) but
now believe that the process is being used to create time consuming
obstacles. Only those changes which promise to add promptness to the
system (primarily by reducing or channeling litigation) will be
supported by industrial proponents of offshore leasing. Their support
is crucial to effecting any change.
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EIS "Intervenor Debates": One Possible Solution
The Department of the Interior is the sole producer of EISs for offshore
oil and gas leasing, and these EISs constitute (or at least describe in
some ways) a major portion of the planning that is done to prepare for
the leases, consider alternatives for drilling and attempt to mitigate
whatever impacts may result from eventual oil development and
production activities.
Not all planning professionals (including scientists and
lawyers) concerned with offshore oil and gas are working for DOI; a
great many professional planners are at work in state and local
governments as well as in environmental groups and industry
organizations. Since industry is the potential lessee, these other groups
have seen it as having much greater access to DOI's planning process
for leasing. For the most part, the other groups appear to have only
very limited opportunities to respond to proposals made by DOI.
Those outside of industry and DOI have attempted to increase their
influence over the process through litigation. Evidence for this lies in
the.large number of law suits filed against offshore EISs in the last
decade. The US General Accounting Office (1982) has pointed out that
defending DOI's leasing schedules and site-specific EISs is expensive
and has caused delay in the leasing process, which is precisely the
opposite of what successive administrations have sought for the last
ten years.
As we have seen, DOI policies are, at least on paper, committed
to accomplishing this leasing in a manner that "balances" the need for
increased production with the risks to the environment. This
balancing is difficult because the benefits of production are largely
national (or at least regional), while the impacts from offshore
activities are almost entirely local. Criticism of the EISs and how they
are used often centers around locally based issues of impacts on the
natural and social environment. However, beyond commenting on
work already done by DOI, there are few avenues for concerned local
citizens to become part of the decision making process.
Two elements of the current process that provide possible
mechanisms for local and state involvement are scoping and adherence
to state coastal zone management provisions. I have shown above that
both of these approaches have been weakened recently by either current
DOI practices or Supreme Court rulings. It should be clear that a more
direct, legislatively defined mechanism needs to be put in place to
ensure that states, environmental groups, and industry have
opportunities to be directly involved in the prelease sale decision
making process. Several of this issue's Commentors believe that such
legislation will be needed in order to force DOI to change its policies
[7].
What would this new process be like? O'Hare (1980) has
suggested several principles for improving the way information is
gathered and used in decision making that have particular relevance to
EISs. First he argues that, in providing information to participants in
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the process, emphasis should be placed on the demand-side (rather
than using the supply-side strategy described above). We must find
better ways to determine what different groups need and want to know
and then genuinely attempt to provide that information. Second,
information should be packaged in ways that enable EIS readers to
readily determine what the impacts might be on them. This could be
done by targeting known reader groups for analytical and graphic
attention much in the way that advertising and museum exhibits try to
highlight important concepts that catch the attention of different types
of people. By using this basic concept augemented by creative indexing
and good summaries, DOI could ensure that everyone who might be
affected by the proposed leasing would be able to easily determine what
the impacts might be.
Third, DOI must accept that almost no one is going to see the
EIS as objective, particularly when DOI is producing the document.
This will automatically aid O'Hare's fourth key suggestion that
mechanisms be found to discourage groups from staking out their
positions too early in the process. If they start with set positions that are
far apart at the beginning, the decision too easily becomes one of
"either/or" and there is no room for discussion. Instead, groups will be
much more likely to listen, learn and reach compromises, if they begin
with the understanding that they will have an opportunity to agree on
what the basic facts are, to negotiate the appropriateness of the range of
alternatives, to ask questions of the other parties and have full access to
information for developing their own position, and to negotiate
aspects of the final leasing decision.
Finally, O'Hare believes that government (DOI) should only be
in the business of providing "public good" information, the things
that everyone in the process will want to know -e.g. the kinds of
environmental impacts that can be expected to result from various
alternatives and the fiscal impacts on governments (since tax money is
being used).
Where do these principles lead? Similar suggestions have been
voiced by a diverse group of planners (Davidoff 1965, Steeg 1976,
O'Hare 1980) and several of our Commentors [7,8,9]. An appropriate
technique would be to provide financing ("intervenor compensation"
in O'Hare's words) for "debate intervenors" -groups or coalitions
that would develop their own alternatives to DOI leasing proposals
and analyze them in some form of a modified EIS or EA. The resulting
EISs would be similar to legal briefs and would argue the validity of
just one or two proposed alternatives. When brought together, these
modified EISs could then be debated and a set of alternatives negotiated
that took into account the concerns of each of the intervenors.
The forum for such a negotiation would need to be as neutral as
possible, especially in light of the degree to which some of the potential
intervenors now view DOI as being on the side of industry. One
possible solution would be to create an interagency panel to make the
final leasing decisions. This panel might be composed of a
324 EIA REVIEW 4/3-4
44
representative from Minerals Management Service (generally seen as
promoting development), National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (seen as being in favor of conservation and protection)
and the Environmental Protection Agency (probably in between). On
different points of the lease sale agreement consensus would be
possible, and where voting were used the votes might easily swing back
and forth depending on the issue being debated.
The adoption of such a process would have several virtues. Only
that information that is really needed for the EIA process would be
produced, and there would be much less concern about whether the
documents were objective since everyone would know from the start
that, like legal briefs, they are not. In addition, it would force
competition among each of the major actors to gain the political
support needed to see their alternative chosen. As a result, the quality
of EISs would improve since the alternatives considered would be
genuinely different and carefully analyzed.
Costs might also be lower. Litigation would presumably be
reduced since each of the concerned parties would have much more
access to the process and would be likely to have at least part of their
proposal included in the final decision. Regulations could dictate the
conditions under which litigation would be permitted, probably only
for actions taken by DOI in its role as the organizer of the debates and
controller of the processes (although its vote would not count more
than that of NOAA or EPA). Financing could be provided to each of
the major intervenors by way of revenue from OCS leases and royalties
(in the same way the oil spill and fishing industry contingency funds
are now established). Limits to financing and expenditure would need
to be adhered to in order to ensure that no one advocate had an unfair
financial advantage over the others.
DOI could be expected to determine the primary alternatives to
be analyzed and then invite proposals by potential intervenors.
Coalitions would then form around the obvious alternative choices,
such as the American Petroleum Institute or groups of companies,
combinations of environmental groups, regional groups of counties or
the state coastal zone management authority. To ensure that the
"invisible hand" of this political market was in good working order,
DOI would not analyze specific alternatives itself, but instead would be
a part of the final decision-making process and provide mechanisms
for arbitration of disputes. There would also need to be provisions for
allowing intervenors to propose and analyse their own alternatives.
The length and costs of producing EISs could also be reduced by
having DOI produce baseline reports on the environments expected to
be affected by offshore activity (the public goods information).
Disagreements about the baseline facts could be settled by negotiations
between the various intervenors. Attention could then be focused
directly on the alternatives themselves, the possible impacts and
mitigation efforts.
A number of technical and organizational problems would need
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to be worked out. Some proprietary industry data might need to be
open to all groups to ensure that industry proposals did not have an
unfair advantage. This should not be a serious matter however, since
little of such information would be very useful for making most of the
decisions that need to be made. Probably the most difficult task of all
would be getting Congress to approve such a system. This may require
a time when Congress believes DOI is too heavy handed in its treatment
of opposition, or when litigation has gotten out of control. And we
may be fast approaching such a time.
The length of time needed for these negotiations and debates
over alternatives would be considerable at the start of the program, but
would probably be about the same as or shorter than for the current
system over the longer term (especially when litigation is taken into
account). As intervenors begin to agree on most of the factual issues
and are freed to concentrate on analysis, political agreements and some
measure of consensus and compromise could be carried over from one
lease sale debate to the next.
The practical disadvantages and problems of this concept
should not be allowed to overshadow its most important and positive-
value. Particularly for those parties mostly left out of the existing
system, the states and environmental groups, this "debate intervenor"
system would clearly be more open and allow for genuine
contributions by all the relevant parties to the decision-making
process. For DOI and the industry, both of whom face criticism from
these same groups almost constantly, this system might become known
as the "put up or shut up" system. But no matter what it ends up being
named, it should be an improvement for all concerned.
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Appendix 1: Commentors on the EIS Process
Environmental Groups
[1] Sarah Chasis Five-Year Lease Sale Schedule
Natural Resources Defense Council
[2] Douglas Foy North Atlantic
Conservation Law Foundation
[3] Ronald Mechur
Vineyard Open Land Foundation
[4] Michele Perrault
Sierra Club
[5] Marsha Rockefeller
Massachusetts Audobon Society
Academia
[6] David M. Hickok
Arctic Environmental Information
Data Center, University of Alaska
[7] Robert Howarth
The Ecosystems Center
Marine Biological Laboratory
[8] Carol Jones
Philadelphia Academy of Natural Science
[9] Ralph Willmer
McGregor and Associates
Federal/State/Local Government
[10] Shehla Anjum.
North Slope Borough
[11] Susan Bolton
US House Subcommittee
for the Coast Guard
[12] Charles Colgan
State of Maine Planning Office
[13] Elizabeth Herland Five-Year L
Office of the Governor of Florida
[14] Andrew Schiffrin
Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors
[15] L. Thomas Tobin
California Coastal Commission
North Atlantic
Central California
North Atlantic
Beaufort Sea
North Atlantic
North Atlantic
North Atlantic
Beaufort Sea
North Atlantic
North Atlantic
ease Sale Schedule
Central California
Central California
Petroleum Industry
[16] Mark R. Fraker Beaufort Sea
Sohio Petroleum Co.
The authors were unable to locate additional petroleum industry
spokesmen willing to comment. The industry commentary included
in the article is from published sources.
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Appendix 2: Questions for Commentors
Commentors were asked to review the Summaries of EISs sent to them
and comment on the quality of the EIS and how it had actually been
used in the decision-making process. A set of questions were provided
to give the commentors an idea of what types of information were
being requested. Commentors were requested to submit about two to
three paragraphs of comment for each question. However, it was also
made clear that any additional views they wished to express were
welcome. The guiding questions asked of the Commentors are listed
below. In addition to these substantive questions about the EISs and
the EIA process, these Commentors also acted as reviewers of the
Summaries, indicating where we had made mistakes or
misinterpretations of what the original EISs had stated.
The Decision-Making Process For Offshore Oil and Gas
* Please describe what you believe to have been the effects that this EIS actually had
on the lease sale.
* Were changes in the number and location of tracts offered, or in the conditions of
the sale affected by findings in the EIS? If so, please describe. [This question was
omitted for Commentors of the Five-Year Schedule EISs.]
Public Participation
* Were the opportunities for concerned observers to participate in the development of
this EIS adequate? Please say why.
* Were all the appropriate groups requested to participate by the Department of
Interior?
* Please indicate in what ways concerned groups or individuals have (or have not)
had opportunities to influence postlease sale exploration and/or development
activities.
* The question above was rephrased for Commentors on the Five-Year Schedule EISs
the question to read: Please indicate in what ways concerned groups or individuals
have (or have not) had opportunities to influence subsequent reviews of the Five-
Year Schedule and leasing procedures.
Interactions between Science and Politics
* In many cases, a Final EIS does not answer all questions or issues raised in the Draft.
Recognizing that there is a need to avoid encyclopedic treatment of all potential
impacts, how well do you think the FEIS responded to the written comments on the
DEIS? Can you give an illustrative example?
* How well did the FEIS take into account oral testimony given at the public
hearings? Again, is there a good example?
* To what extent were criticisms of this EIS taken into account in the production of
later EISs for this same region?
* The question above was rephrased for Commentors on the Five-Year Schedule EISs
to read: How well were criticisms of the 1980 Schedule FEIS taken into account in
the production of the 1981 Schedule FEIS?
Quality of the Document
* Were there instances of major factual or interpretive errors, inadequacies or
ommissions which remained in the FEIS and which had a significant influence on
the eventual decisions with respect to the lease sale?
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* In particular, how accurate did you find: Oil spill probabilities and trajectory
models? Estimates of ecosystem resiliency and cumulative impacts? Estimates of
effectiveness of oil spill cleanup technology?
* At the time the DEIS and FEIS were produced, were the facts and interpretations of
fact consistent with the best information then available? Please say why you think
this.
Notes
1. Offshore oil and gas leases are contracts authorizing companies or
individuals to explore for, develop and produce petroleum
resources; the term may also refers to the land covered by such
contracts. A lease is usually for one tract which approximates 2,330
hectares (nine square miles) and is normally held for a primary
term of five years. Lease sales (or offerings) are public openings of
sealed bids made after competitive auction for leases.
2. The summaries of these EISs were written by me and Lisa Berzok
for publication in this special issue of Environmental Impact
Assessment Review.
3. The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Maine, 1975,
upheld this division of the OCS and was a major turning point in
federal/state offshore relations. The decision allowed for the
stepped-up leasing process to continue and spurred states to push
for amendments to the OSCLA (Goldstein 1982, Robadue and
Tippie 1980).
4. Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (1972), Marine
Mammal Protection Act (1972), Endangered Species Act (1973),
Coastal Zone Management Act (1972 and amended 1976).
5. Production in 1982 was about 125,000 tons per day (Essertier 1983).
6. Recoverable resources (or reserves) is the quantity of oil or gas
available from a natural reservoir, as estimated from an appraisal
of the field multiplied by a recovery factor which takes into
account technical difficulties and economic costs of extraction.
Generally this is one third of the amount estimated from
exploratory drilling, seismic testing and other means.
Geohazards are features or conditions that, if undetected, may
seriously jeopardize offshore oil and gas exploration and
development operations. Once identified, they may necessitate
special engineering procedures or relocation of a well. Such
hazards may include ustable bottom conditions or underwater
canyons.
7. Although Figure 1 indicates that scoping begins ten months prior
to the Call for Information, in practice scoping can occur any time
up until the release of the DEIS. For Central California Sale #73,
only 40 days separated the publication of the request for scoping
comments and publication of the DEIS.
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8. Alternatives are different possible development schemes, each
having sets of possible positive and negative impacts on the
environment.
9. The no-action alternative is required by NEPA to be included in
the EIS and considers what impacts would likely occur if the
project was not done.
10. In addition to the EISs developed specifically in response to lease
sales, several other projects related to offshore drilling have been
required to submit EISs under NEPA. Several proposed deep water
oil loading ports and onshore fabrication plants for construction
of drilling rigs have submitted EISs. In the Arctic, EISs have been
required for several projects related to oil production in the
Beaufort Sea: the Waterflood project which involves extensive
dredging for gravel to construct artificial drilling islands
(requiring a permit from the US Army Corps of Engineers), and of
course, the Trans-Alaskan Oil Pipeline, which resulted in the the
production of the largest EIS ever done. In the future, should
commercial discoveries of oil and gas be found in frontier areas,
other EISs can be expected to be required for the building 'of
refineries, other loading ports and fabrication yards, and
pipelines. All of these associated projects are the result of offshore
leasing. In an effort to focus directly on the lease sale process, these
types of EISs were not considered in this study.
11. The following approach was used to assess how offshore oil and
gas lease sale EISs are being utilized for decison-making. First,
reviews of other types of EISs and the literature on US EIA
processes in general were consulted to develop a set of issues and
problem areas to consider specifically for petroleum leasing EISs.
Next, a representative selection of recent EISs was chosen for
review. Summaries were written for each of these EISs and sent to
people who had been involved in each of the lease sale EIA
processes. These "Commentors" were asked a series of guiding
questions to elicit their opinions about the quality and use of the
EISs with which they had experience. Their comments were
finally considered, along with the author's own assessment and
other published information. This section outlines the outcome of
this process.
12. The EISs chosen for summarization and review were picked to be
representative of three factors:
* Region: one EIS was selected from each of the major frontier
lease sale planning regions -Atlantic, California Pacific,
and Alaska. (Alaska is actually considered to have three
planning regions -Southern Alaska, Bering Sea and
Arctic-but limitations on time and other resources
prevented doing a summary of an EIS from each of these
frontier regions).
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" Date: the EISs spaned several years in order to consider
changes in document quality (It should be emphasised that
only a very subjective sense of this could be obtained from a
review of only five documents. In particular it is not possible
to distinquish between effects of time and differences in the
quality of the regional offices of DOI.)
* Type: the major types of EISs being produced are those for
area wide leasing, for regional sales, with and without
Supplements, and for state/federal sales; programmatic
(Five-Year Schedule) as well as site-specific EISs were
considered.
13. In order to have sufficient time to invite expert commentary on the
quality of the EISs and their use in decision-making, these EISs
were chosen at the beginning of the study to satisfy the criteria
listed above. Several of the prospective Commentors contacted
during the course of the study suggested that other offshore
petroleum EISs might have been better choices to learn about the
'current state of the EIA process. Several suggested that the more
recent EISs for North Atlantic Sale #52 or Mid-Atlantic #59 and
Beaufort Sea Sale #71 (see Table 1, Five-Year Schedule Summary)
might be more representative of the current quality of EISs for
those areas. One commentor thought that Central California Sale
=53 would have been better than #73, which he considered too
recent. In addition, the state/federal aspect of the Beaufort Sea Sale
=BS also turned out to have little bearing on the documents'
quality or use.
14. In some cases Commentors suggested that we refer to published
articles or unpublished reports written by them for additional
information. To distinguish these materials from the Comments
generated by our questions to the Commentors and to ensure that
readers may find these sources, attributions involving these
written materials will be designated in the usual citation format
and the reference found in the bibliography (e.g. [6, Colgan 1982]
would refer to a conclusion drawn from both comments by
Commentor #6 and published remarks by Colgan).
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Five Summaries of EISs on
Proposed Oil and Gas
Leasing in Frontier Areas
These summaries outline the information and
interpretations found in some recent EISs for offshore
leasing in the North Atlantic, off the coast of Central
California and in the Beaufort Sea. A summary of the most
recent Five-Year Schedule EISs is included to provide a
perspective on the direction of current EIA processes for
offshore leasing.
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Final Environmental Statement
Proposed Five-Year OCS Oil and Gas
Lease Sale Schedule
March 1980 - February 1985
Final Supplement to the Final
Environmental Statement
Proposed Five-Year OCS Oil and Gas
Lease Sale Schedule
January 1982 - December 1986
US Department of the Interior
Bureau of Land Management
December 1979 and June 1982
The Five Year Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Oil and Gas Lease Sale
Schedule (Five-Year Schedule) is the central programmatic document
for the Department of Interior's (DOI) offshore leasing program. The
Five-Year Schedule indicates the size, timing and location of leasing
activities that the Secretary of the Interior believes will best meet
national energy needs during the proposed five-year period. The Five-
Year Schedule informs the general public, the states and federal
agencies about the offshore leasing actions being considered. The US
leasing program is currently operating under a Five-Year Schedule
adopted by the Reagan Administration in July 1982 (1982 Schedule).
Developed as a revision of the Carter Administration's Five-Year
Schedule (1980 Schedule), the current program emphasizes
"streamlining" of the leasing process to expand and accelerate sales
throughout the OCS of the US.
The Final Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS) for both of
the Five-Year Schedules are summarized here for several reasons.
Technically, the EIS for the 1982 Schedule is a supplement to the 1980
Schedule EIS and, therefore, it relies on the 1980 Schedule EIS for
much of its conceptual framework and background information. In
Environmental Impact Assessme~nt Re% iew. VA, N.3-4
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addition, the 1982 Schedule EIS is the result, in part, of a court-
required revision and improvement of the 1980 Schedule EIS. Most
importantly, the 1982 Schedule reflects major changes in leasing
policy and strategy by streamlining and accelerating the lease process.
This in turn has led to other changes in the EIA process for offshore oil
and gas activities, particularly the production of"area-wide" EISs for;
considering the impacts of lease sales conducted for whole planning
areas or regions.
SCOPE OF THE EISs
History of the 1980 and 1982 Five-Year Schedules
The first major step in the long process of retrieving oil and gas from
the OCS is the prelease sale preparation. The 1953 OCS Lands Act
(OCSLA) is the central legislation controlling and directing offshore
oil and gas leasing. Almost completely rewritten in 1978 to reflect
changing national priorities for energy production and environmental
prptection, the Act as amended (OCSLAA) directs the Secretary of the
Interior to include in the leasing program a Five-Year Schedule and
procedures for reviewing the plan each year and revising it if
necessary.1
The 1980 Schedule was the first Five-Year Schedule prepared in
accordance with OCSLAA, and a review of it was begun in December
1980 by Carter Administration officials. As part of this first review, a
conceptual proposal was drafted, but not approved, outlining ideas for
streamlining the lease process. Specific recommendations (as cited in
US General Accounting Office 1981) included:
" offering entire OCS areas for lease and eliminating the tract
selection process;
" replacing the call for nominations and comments with a call
for information;
" shortening preparation of the DEIS to eight months;
" eliminating the Secretarial Issue Document (SID) and
including the information formerly contained in the SID in
the FEIS and a decision memorandum;
" preparing the proposed notice of sale and the FEIS
simultaneously; and
" preparing tract-specific resource economic evaluations after,
rather than prior to, a lease sale.
Reagan administration officials finished the review required by
OCSLAA but went far beyond the Carter administration in
recommending that virtually the entire US OCS be considered for lease
(over four hundred million hectares). This recommendation was
included in the first revision and reapproval of a Five-Year Schedule
under OCSLAA (US General Accounting Office 1981; Foy 1984).
During the review process for the 1980 Five-Year Schedule, the
Reagan DOI solicited comments from the public, states and federal
agencies as required by OCSLAA. Most state officials recommended no
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change in the lease scheduling, whereas the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, environmental organizations, several
local officials and a few states suggested delays for specific lease sales.
Industry expressed differences of opinion about whether the lease sale
process should be streamlined; some concerns were expressed about
their ability to participate in an accelerated program (US General
Accounting Office 1981). The streamlining provisions were consistent
with suggestions made by the Heritage Foundation that the 1980
Schedule did not allow for leasing that was"aggressive" enough
(Heritage Foundation 1980 as cited in US General Accounting Office
1981).
In addition to the public comments, two Reagan
administration policies-achieving energy independence and
balancing the federal budget-may have also influenced the
development of the 1982 leasing schedule. In its review of the proposed
1982 Schedule, the General Accounting Office (GAO) (1981) indicated
that, of the three influences, only the Administration's policy to
promote energy independence by accelerating mineral leasing
appeared to have been important to the decision to revise the Five-Year
Schedule. Public comment appeared to have had only a minor effect on
the decision. However, the GAO could not be entirely certain of this
interpretation since they were denied access to many relevant
administration documents and did not have time to pursue legal
means to acquire the information. In the 1982 Schedule EIS, DOI
indicated that they relied on public comment a great deal.
Table 1 indicates the important dates during the process of
implementing the 1982 Schedule. The Draft Supplemental 1982
Schedule EIS was issued and the Schedule itself announced in mid-
1981. Simultaneously, the US Court of Appeals was hearing a suit
against the 1980 Schedule (see below) and issued its decision on
October 6, 1981. On January 19, 1982, the Minerals Management
Service (MMS) was created to consolidate all federal mineral leasing
activities including those for offshore oil.
As Table 1 makes clear, lease sales were held, as determined by
the 1980 Schedule, throughout this period of policy change. Legal
challenges to the 1980 Schedule delayed distribution of the Final
Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement and the full
implementation of the streamlined and accelerated leasing program
until July 21, 1982.
DOI attempted to implement accelerated leasing as soon as they
had submitted the program to Congress.2 However, because of the
administrative momentum built into the leasing system, acceleration
of the lease sale process, while begun in early 1982, was not really
expected to produce earlier lease sales until 1984 (General Accounting
Office 1981). Of the 18 lease sales scheduled between the approval of the
1982 Schedule and April 1984 (the time of this writing), only 10 were to
have been held significantly sooner than originally planned in the
1980 Schedule. Of these 10 only three were held before the date
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originally set by the 1980 Schedule (sales #71,76, 78), and of these three,
only one was held as early as predicted in the 1982 Schedule (#78). Six
sales of the scheduled 18 have been cancelled or put on hold, usually by
legal challenges.
The Five-Year Schedule as Coordinator of the
Offshore Leasing Process
Unlike other offshore EISs for individual lease sales, both Five-Year
Schedule EISs are program documents and are not intended to be site
specific. There is discussion in both of these EISs about the lease sale
planning areas and possible impacts on them. However, there is only
limited discussion of the Five-Year Schedule's primary role in the
decision-making process. The discussion describes the direction that
federal leasing policy is taking and provides a general overview of the
possible consequences of that policy.
Both of these Five-Year Schedules are based on the general
policies outlined in the OCSLAA which seek "to make oil and gas
resources available to meet the Nation's needs as rapidly as possible
and to balance resource development with protection of the human,
marine and coastal environments" (US Bureau of Land Management
1979). More specifically, when developing a Five-Year Schedule, DOI
is directed by Section 18 of OCSLAA to consider the following (among
others):
* an equitable sharing of development benefits and
environmental risks among regions;
* other uses of the OCS including fisheries, navigation, sea
lanes, and deepwater ports;
* interests of potential oil and gas producers; and
* the environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of
different OCS areas (General Accounting Office 1981).
In comments on the Draft of the 1980 Schedule EIS and again in
a law suit against the 1980 Schedule, some observers of the Schedule
development process argued that the"equitable sharing" of benefits
and risks both between regions and between different ocean uses was
not adequately considered in the 1980 Schedule EIS. They also
complained that the procedural requirements for establishing the
program had not been followed by the Carter Administration. In its
October 1981 ruling about the 1980 Schedule EIS, the US Court of
Appeals agreed and indicated that the 1980 Schedule EIS should be
revised to reflect these shortcomings. Simultaneous with the court
proceedings, however, the Reagan Administration had revised the 1980
Five-Year Schedule (as a result of the OCSLAA-required review) and in
June 1981 had issued a Draft Supplement EIS to reflect their proposals
for streamlining the leasing process (as described above). The Court's
ruling had the effect of requiring the Reagan DOI to revise this Draft
Supplement EIS since the same procedures as those used in the
development of the 1980 Schedule had been followed. These revisions
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Table 1. Comparison of 1980 and 1982 Leasing Schedules and Important Dates in Program Development
Sale Sale 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
# Area JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND
0
t~1
til
$
+
A62
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62
46
53
RS-1
A66
56
60
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67
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69(1)
69(2)
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72
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74
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80
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87
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GM
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CNC
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GM
SA
Cl
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MA
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SC
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NTB
C
SGB
MA
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NA
NVB
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Se-Supplemental 1982 Schedule DEIS Released
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x
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x
May Be Dropped
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A
BA
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SC
A
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Key
+ = 1980 Schedule = Both Schedules x = 1982 Schedule $ = Date of Actual Sale (absence of other symbols indicates that dates for Schedule and Sale were the same.)
Sale Areas
A = Atlantic CS = Chukchi Sea MA = Mid Atlantic SA = South Atlantic
BA = Barrow Arch DF = Daipir Field NA = North Atlantic SAK = South Alaska (Incl. CI.S.K,GOA)
BS = Beaufort Sea EGM Eastern Gulf of Mexico NAB = North Aleutian Basin SC = Southern California
C = California GM Gulf of Mexico NTB = Norton Basin SGB = St. George Basin
Cl = Cook Inlet GOA Gulf of Alaska NVB = Navarin Basin WGM = Western Gulf of Mexico
CGM = Central Gulf of Mexico HB - Hope Basin RS = Reoffering Sale
CNC = Central/Northern California K = Kodiak S = Shumagin
Sources: Swiler 1983; US Bureau of Land Management 1979; US Bureau of Land Management 1982.
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were then included as part of the Final Supplemental EIS issued in
July 1982. Whether the four conditions required by OCSLAA were
adequately included in the 1982 Schedule remains a point of
contention for critics of the streamlined procedure (Perrault 1984).
OCS Lease Areas
Federal offshore leasing areas have been established for the entire
length of the US coastline. Six planning regions - Atlantic, Gulf of
Mexico, Pacific, Southern Alaska, Bering Sea and Arctic - are divided
into 18 planning areas for which lease sales may be held. Figures 2 and
3 in the article by Stedman shows the lease areas as they are currently
designated.
Reviewers of the 1980 Schedule DEIS complained that there was
no framework in the document for judging whether or not the
balancing of risks and benefits required by OSCLAA had taken place,
since only large planning areas were considered instead of
hydrographic basins. This deficiency was little improved in the 1980
Schedule FEIS, but in the 1981 Schedule FEIS, DOI believed it had
been corrected by redefining the lease planning areas to conform
somewhat more closely to actual basins (see Figures 2 and 3 in
Stedman). Critics believe that even these changes were not sufficient to
allow for determining environmental effects [7,13].3
Streamlining the OCS Leasing Process
Perhaps an issue more important than the issue of the boundaries was
the way in which leasing was expected to take place for each planning
area. Streamlining of the lease sale process and area-wide lease sales
were the major changes in the leasing procedures introduced in the
1982 Schedule.
Northern and Central California, the Blake Plateau portion of
the South Atlantic, and many of the Alaskan planning areas are
"frontier" areas, where lease offerings were being planned for the first
time. To allow time for environmental studies to produce information
and for regional planning efforts to be put into operation, a general
formula was applied in the 1980 Schedule FEIS that sought to leave
three years between the first and second leases in a frontier area and two
years between all subsequent leases. This formula, balanced against
the OCSLAA mandate to produce oil from the OCS as quickly as
possible, yielded the primary alternative of the 1980 Schedule FEIS,
upon which most of the environmental analysis in that document was
based.
In order to streamline the leasing process, DOI's 1981 Schedule
revised the formula to shorten the amount of time between lease sales
in each area and to reduce the amount of time needed for prelease
activities. In contrast to the more cautious 1980 Schedule, the 1982
Schedule emphasizes earlier first-time leasing in frontier areas, more
frequent subsequent leasing in locations thought to be the best for
petroleum discoveries, and a generally accelerated pace for all leasing.
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Lease sales area also conducted for vastly larger areas than before (area-
wide leasing, see below).
Figure 1 in the article by Stedman outlines the general
differences between the two programs as described in the 1982 Schedule
FEIS. The 1980 schedule provided for an average of 41 months for
planning Alaskan sales, about 30 months for sales in the Pacific and
Atlantic, and 26 months for the Gulf of Mexico (Table 2). Comparing
the two schedules from the point of the Call for
Nomination/Information, the 1982 Schedule was intended to allow
for only 21 months of prelease activity in all regions.
However, the comparison in Table 2 does not include the
environmental analysis done prior to the Call for Information and
included in Figure 1 in Stedman. When the two procedures are
compared by setting the beginning of the entire process, the Resource
Reports, side-by-side, the 1982 Schedule provided for 33 months of
planning for all sales, which is longer for some regions than the time
specified in the 1980 Schedule. This suggests that it is not the total
amount of time needed for the process which is the significant
difference between the two programs, but instead, the earlier start
projected for the beginning of the process (as much as 12 months for
each sale) and, more importantly, the timing of the EIS relative to other
phases.
In the streamlined 1982 process, the EIS is begun and
socioeconomic, oilspill and air quality modeling and the impact
section are completed long before the tracts likely to be leased are
known. Under the 1980 Schedule procedures, in contrast, tracts were
selected prior to analysis work. It is clear, therefore, that the impact
sections of EISs produced under the 1982 Schedule could be expected to
describe only a very general picture of many possible effects that
exploration and development might have. Specific impacts could not
be foreseen and considered. This has been a major criticism of some
very recent EISs.
Quite a few reviewers of the Supplemental DEIS for the 1982
Schedule and several of the Commentors believe that the streamlined
procedures might result in inadequate NEPA documents and that
without preselection of tracts, environmental safeguards might be
more difficult to plan for [7]. DOI assured these critics that sufficient
opportunities existed for deleting sensitive tracts and that although the
preparation time for documents had been shortened, the area-wide
focus of each sale would give commentors even more time to make
suggestions, since the general site of concern would be known so far in
advance of each sale.
One important part of the procedure, scoping, which is
included in both schedules as required by OCSLAA and by the revised
1979 NEPA regulations, was expected by DOI to help ensure public
participation. In its ideal form (Sachs and Clark 1981) and as generally
practiced by US federal agencies (Wood 1984), scoping begins after a
notice of intent has been published (the Call for
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Table 2. Percentage of Time Allocated to Prelease Planning Steps
1980 Schedule
Gulf of Mexico
Mo
Call for nominations
Tentative tract
selection
EIS process
Tract selection
State review
Energy review
Final sale notice
Final notice to sale
Total
1
Pacific Atlantic Alaska
nths Percent Months Percent Months Percent Months Percent Events
2 7.5 2 7 2 6.5 3 7.0 Call for
informa-
tion
2 7.5 3 10 3 10.0 4 9.5 Area
Identi-
fication
5 58.0 18 60 19 61.5 27 66.0 EIS
Process*
2 7.5
2 7.5
1 4.0
2
2
1
7
7
3
2
2
1
6.5
6.5
3.0
2
2
1
5.0
5.0
2.5
State and
Energy
Review
1 4.0 1 3 1 3.0 1 2.5 Final sale
notice
1 4.0 1 3 1 3.0 1 2.5 Final
notice to
sale
26 100 30 100 31 100 41 100
1982 Schedule
Months Percent
2 9.50
2 9.50
13 62.00
2 9.50
1 4.75
1 4.75
21 100.00
E
'N
b~k.
o.'
Does not include any environmental analysis done prior to the call for information. EIS process includes preparation of EIS and public
hearings on the draft statement.
Source: US General Accounting Office 1981
Information/Nomination of Figure 2) and before the DEIS is begun,
and it involves meetings between federal agencies and interested
parties to determine significant issues to be considered in the DEIS.
There is also the expectation that scoping comments and agreements
will be used in good faith.
Figure 1 in Stedman shows that in terms of timing, the
streamlined DOI procedures run counter to general federal agency
practice and what is considered to be "best" practice, since scoping
begins after the DEIS has been started. This should not have been a
serious problem, however, because scoping, as outlined by the 1982
Schedule, is to begin only one month after the DEIS is begun and 21
months before the DEIS is scheduled to be published. However, in
practice, this timetable has not always been followed. Reports on the
Central California Lease Sale #73 (see summary this volume) indicate
that, despite repeated requests by the California Coastal Commission
(CCC), DOI refused to hold scoping meetings and relied instead on
written scoping comments. In addition, the DEIS for California Lease
Sale #73 was issued a mere 40 days after scoping, suggesting that few or
n6ne of the ideas resulting from scoping could have been incorporated
into the DEIS (California Coastal Commission 1983).
One procedure under the streamlined system which could have
been expected to make public involvement more difficult was the
shortening of the comment period for DEISs; the period was reduced
from 60 days in the 1980 Schedule procedures to 45 days in the 1982
Schedule. In addition, hearings on DEISs have been held at
inappropriate or insufficiently few locations in a number of recent
instances, Lease Sale #73 and #52 (Georges Bank) in particular. There
also appears to be a general trend toward reducing public access to
federal agency review comments prior to publication of the FEIS. In
one case, Sale #52, critical comments of the DEIS by the New England
regional EPA office failed to appear in any form in the FEIS, and their
recommendations were ignored (Perrault 1984, Williams 1984). When
combined with the reduced period between the release of the DEIS and
publication of the FEIS, the streamlined procedures have made public
participation more difficult than under the old procedures.
Finally, the streamlined procedures intended that the Proposed
Notice of Sale and the FEIS be issued within the same month. There
was no discussion in the 1982 Five-Year Schedule FEIS of whether the
Secretary of Interior could adequately weigh the findings and
alternatives of a lease sale FEIS within a month in order to make a
decision about what to lease. For some observers, this has been their
most important concern.
Each of these procedural changes (and others) were questioned
by reviewers of the 1982 Schedule DEIS. In each case, DOI provided
assurances that opportunities for public participation would not be
seriously reduced due to the new procedures. The problems
encountered to date with the streamlined procedures indicate that
public participation has indeed been reduced and that public
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comments are taken into account by the Reagan DOI much less than by
previous administrations.
Area-Wide Leasing
Much of the streamlining of the lease sale process outlined in the 1982
Schedule FEIS depended on a major change in how DOI expected to
lease the OCS. The 1980 Five-Year Schedule was based on the belief
that careful analysis of each tract being proposed for leasing was
necessary to adequately ensure environmental protection and fair
market value for the tracts. The government considered itself
responsible for choosing, in advance, which tracts could be bid on by
industry. In sharp contrast, the Reagan DOI introduced area-wide
leasing. Based on the premise that industry would be. in a better
position to determine which tracts should be leased, this free-market
approach to leasing made possible a system of leasing which is both
expanded and accelerated.
Whole leasing areas (Figure 2 and 3 in Stedman) were to be (and
have been) proposed for leasing. By opening almost all of the nation's
OCS to possible leasing, more acreage could be leased because many
presumably marginal tracts might be leased at relatively low cost and
only a few environmentally sensitive or legally mandated tracts would
be specifically excluded from leasing.
The 1982 Schedule EIS cited several reasons for using area-wide
leasing. Two of these reasons focused on producing more petroleum:
* Significant OCS petroleum resources were believed to exist,
but locations were not well known.
" Differences of geologic opinion existed about where to look.
However the other two reasons were based on policy decisions to speed
up discovery and allow the market to operate:
" Companies would be free"to pursue unique and diverse
exploration strategies."
" Companies should be able to concentrate on the tracts they
thought most promising.
It is clear from Figure 1 in Stedman that several elements of the
streamlining depend on area-wide leasing. Elimination of the tract
selection process, replacing the Call for Nominations (of what should
be offered for lease) with a Call for Information (about what should not
be leased), and shortening of the EIS preparation time were all made
possible by the change to this new system. In addition, area-wide
"6reconnaissance studies" were expected to replace more tract-specific
research, thereby reducing the prelease efforts for modeling potential
impacts and oil spill trajectories.
The development of area-wide leasing is undoubtedly the most
significant change in policy to affect offshore oil activities for many
years. Reviewers of the Supplement DEIS for the 1982 Schedule
obviously understood this and questioned numerous elements of what
was being proposed. While DOI apparently changed parts of the FEIS
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for the 1982 Schedule in response to some comments, many of its
answers to the commentors indicate that DOI believed that enough
information and explanation had been originally provided. Some
critics have argued that DOI also believes that it has a mandate to
accelerate the process and that serious responses to comments will slow
the pace and are not needed.
ALTERNATIVES
1980 Lease Sale Schedule
The 1980 Schedule EIS outlined ten alternatives for scheduling. A
number of these reflected the policy differences and concerns of several
states and agencies, which had prompted the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) to include them as alternatives in the EIS. The ten
alternatives arrayed themselves into five distinct categories:
I. DOI's Primary Alternative, based on the most rapid possible
development of the OCS within established guidelines;
II. Department of Energy Proposal, designed "to maximize net
economic value of the Schedule as a whole" (Bureau of Land
Management 1979);
III - VII. Schedules with Omitted or Delayed Sales, often
reflecting state concerns about the environmental sensitivity or lack of
information and planning for certain regions but not truly different
from Alternatives I or II;
VIII - IX. Schedules Combining Omitted and Delayed Sales,
designed to be significantly different from other Alternatives; and
X. No Action and Conservation.
By most measures -expected production, acreage, number of sales and
wells, anticipated spills -Alternatives I - VII were not genuinely
different from each other.
Even Alternatives VIII and IX were not very different from the
other schedules considered except that there were about 35 percent
fewer oil spills (greater than 140 tons) expected as a result of either of
these schedules. This could be attributed mainly to the large number of
expected spills that were eliminated by omitting sales #57 (North
Basin), #70 (St. George Basin), and #85 (Chukchi Sea, since renamed
Barrow Arch), all areas with especially high ratios of anticipated oil
spills per well drilled (Table 3).
The 1980 Schedule EIS attempted to provide information on the
expected impacts of scheduled offshore oil activities by first assessing
the impacts of the Primary Alternative I and then comparing the other
alternatives to it. However, since the other alternatives were not very
different, there was little that needed to be considered, and there was
only limited analysis of them. Alternative X, Conservation, did not
appear to be taken seriously as an alternative, and no careful analysis
was done comparing it to other alternatives.
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Table 3. Expected Number of Oil Spills by Planning Area
Number of Number of
Area* Wells Spills Spills/Well
CS 214 7.35 0.034
Cl 28 0.92 0.031
NVB 206 4.36 0.021
SGB 92 1.84 0.020
NTB 20 0.34 0.017
GOA 14 0.23 0.016
BS 222 3.59 0.016
K 22 0.26 0.012
NAS 22 0.23 0.010
SA 190 1.38 0.007
NA 360 2.04 0.006
MA 230 1.15 0.005
CNC 407 1.65 0.004
SC 1475 4.92 0.003
GOM 3504 3.29 0.001
Total 7006 33.55 0.005
* For codes, see Table 1.
Source: US Bureau of Land Management 1979, Table 11-2
1982 Lease Sale Schedule
Four alternatives were reviewed in the 1982 Schedule EIS with respect
to the possible environmental impacts that each might cause. Several
of these alternatives were further subdivided into one or more
additional options:
I. The Final 1982 Schedule (proposed July 1981), based on
accelerated area-wide leasing which would offer either (1) all
available acreage or (2) only geologically favorable acreage
II. The Draft 1982 Schedule (proposed April 1981), based on
accelerated tract-selection leasing and featuring yearly reoffering
sales
III. The 1980 Schedule (Alternative I from Schedule FEIS), based on
much reduced pacing (compared with the 1982 Schedule
proposals) of tract-selected leasing and offering either (1) only the
acreage proposed in the 1980 Schedule EIS or (2) an increase in
acreage
IV. The Final 1982 Schedule with Modified Alaskan Sales, in four
possible options:
(la) Reduce and delay area-wide leasing in Alaska
(Ib) Reduce and delay area-wide leasing in Alaska and offer only
geologically favorable tracts
(2a) Eliminate all Arctic sales but use area-wide leasing elsewhere
(2b) Eliminate all Arctic sales and offer only geologically
favorable tracts elsewhere
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Taken together, the alternatives and options provided an array
of choices which could be considered against one another as possible
offshore leasing policy. There was no consideration of options to
simply halt leasing or to only lease in areas where drilling had already
occurred or to only lease in areas where there had been previous leases.
Still, the options considered did range from total elimination of Arctic
sales (IV.2) to the most extensive offering system possible (I), and they
offered more genuine choice of alternatives than had the 1980 Schedule
FEIS.
The option to consider only geologically favorable areas (1.2)
appears to have been a compromise between the preferred Area-wide
leasing in Alternative 1.1 and the 1980 Schedule procedure (III.1), since
the streamlining and acceleration of leasing was to be implemented,
but the decision about which tracts should be leased would remain
DOI's responsibility rather than becoming a function of "market"
forces.
Alternative II (proposed in the Supplemental DEIS) was also an
expanded and streamlined leasing program, but it too relied on pre-
s.election of tracts and not on area-wide leasing.
Alternative I11.1 (Alternative I from the 1980 Schedule FEIS)
had been considered by critics just three years before as a rash and
unwarranted acceleration of leasing. In this FEIS it emerged as the
most cautionary alternative available. 111.2 appears to have been
suggested by an environmental group, Natural Resources Defense
Council, as a way to allow more tracts to be leased without accelerating
the pace of leasing within"frontier" areas.
Alternative IV, in all its forms, was developed in response to the
concerns expressed by State of Alaska officials and Arctic area residents
about the effects of petroleum development on the state and Arctic
region. Table 4 compares the expected leasing for Alternatives I, 111.1,
and IV. 1 and makes it apparent that even for Alaska, the 1980 Schedule
was the most cautious proposal.
Table 4. Comparison of Estimated Maximum Acreage Leased Each Year In The
Alaska OCS
1982 Schedule 1980 Schedule
Proposal (Alt. I) Alt. IV-1
1982
1,396,000 1,396,000 2,161,000
1983
3,047,000 0 2,282,000
1984
9,060,000 2,880,000 1,280,000
1985
4,200,000 5,940,000 1,280,000
1986
7,620,000 5,700,000
Totals 25,323,000 15,916,000 7,003,000
Source: US Bureau of Land Management 1982
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LEASE AREA ENVIRONMENTS AND ANTICIPATED IMPACTS
Baseline Environments
Each of the OCS planning areas (Figure 1 in Stedman) was described in
both the 1980 Schedule EIS and 1982 Schedule EIS. In both documents
these summaries were extensive and seemed to cover the major
physical, biological and socioeconomic features of the environment at
risk from offshore activities (although often not at appropriate levels of
analysis). There was, in addition, a great deal more descriptive
information in the impacts sections. Much of this material was not
really separable into a purely descriptive section since discussion of
impacts relied on it so directly.
Table 5 outlines some of the major environmental conditions in
each planning area (based on the 1980 Schedule) that might affect
offshore activities. It is not possible in this short summary to review the
conditions of each planning area, but the other summaries of this issue
do provide a glimpse of three of the major frontier areas - the Beaufort
Sea, Central California, and North Atlantic (Georges Bank).
Format
In format, the 1980 Schedule EIS first assessed at great length the
impact of the Primary Alternative (I) and then briefly compared the
other alternatives to it. For Alternative I, each impact topic was
considered for each planning area. The 1982 Schedule also used this
technique, but considered each major impact topic for each alternative
within each planning area.
The approach taken by the 1980 Schedule EIS resulted in
redundancy, unusual topic divisions, illogical attention to great detail
in some places and not enough in others, and a scattering of important
points throughout the text. The primary effect of this was to make
pertinent information difficult to find and to obfuscate the fact that
important topics were not being discussed at all.
In the 1982 Schedule EIS, there was particular attention paid to
descriptions and impact discussions that would be appropriate for
consideration of area-wide leasing. Even these descriptions were
conceded to be only an outline of the types of descriptions that would
be needed for each sale-specific EIS to be done in the future.
Nevertheless, there was a great deal more information for each area,
and the information was organized in a clearer fashion than in the 1980
Schedule EIS. There was discussion of the possible cumulative effects
of OCS activities, and there was a summary for each area.
Because it was a program document, the 1980 Schedule EIS
made frequent use of the admonition that specific details about
impacts could not be determined without knowing the specific tracts to
be leased, and it then referred the reader to future site-specific EISs. At
the same time, every impact element for each alternative was reviewed
for each geographic planning area; the result was that the
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Table 5. Summary of Environmental Conditions of Planning Areas Expected
to Affect Offshore Oil Development
Condition NAt MA SA GM SC CNC GOA K Cl NAS SGB NVB NTB HB CS BS
Fog * *
* *4* * * * * * * *
33 90 *90 90 * 90 9080 80
* * * **
* 30 180
66 66 * * 83
Rapid
Changes
Severe
Storms
Winds
(kph)
Hurricane/
Cyclone
Strong
Current
(cm/sec)
Ice and
Freezing
( cover)
Extreme
Waves (m)
300+ m
Depth (%)
Unstable
Bottom
Sand
Movement
Seismic
Activity
High Gas
Pressure
Volcanic
Activity
Karst
Topography
66 66
30 32
50 80
4 * * * * * *4 * 4 * * * * *
* *4*
4* ** * *4* * *
** * * * * *4
*4 * 4 *
t For codes see Table 1.
Commonly found in Planning Area (numbers indicate levels of a common
condition)
Especially serious condition for oil and gas activities
Source: US Bureau of Land Management 1979
programmatic impacts that were common or similar to all sites (or
groups of sites) could not be reviewed in a logical step-by-step manner.
This was less of a problem in the 1982 Schedule EIS since more
summarizing of impacts was done both for each location or type of use
(coastal ecosystem, navigation, land use, etc.) and across all the
planning areas. In both documents, there seemed to be adequate
information available to the reader, except that the analysis of
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* * * *4
* *
* * 10 30 * 3020
*
*
* * * *
ecosystem structure and behavior was especially weak in the 1980
Schedule FEIS (it improved somewhat in the 1982 Schedule
Supplement FEIS). In addition, the division of the document by
planning area was a large improvement over the 1980 Schedule FEIS,
since all information for each area was available in one place for easier
reference.
Both documents correctly pointed out that impact analysis is
fundamentally an assessment of the factors of probabilistic risk and
outlined the elements critical to understanding the risks. The 1980
Schedule EIS failed to include the probabilities as part of the analysis,
saying only that (in most cases) not enough was known or that
assessments could not be made without referring to a specific tract. As a
result, the cumulative risk for any given area could not be estimated.
While it is true that many of the needed probabilities were not known
for each area, there were studies that had been done at the time that
were not discussed.
The 1982 Schedule EIS was somewhat better in this regard,
making it clear that "risked" estimates were the basis for the estimates
of the recoverable resources upon which many of the impact
assessments were based. Table 6 indicates the estimates of resources to
be recovered by the 1982 Schedule (Alternative 1.1).
Table 6. Conditional Mean Estimates of Resources to be Recovered from
Adoption of the Proposed Schedule (Alternative 1.1)
Oil/billion Economic
Planning Area bbls Gas/Tcf Transportation Success
North Atlantic 1.8* 7.2 Tanker/Pipeline .99
Mid Atlantic .8 3.4 Tanker/Pipeline .99
(For Sale 76 Only)
South Atlantic .4 1.5 Tanker .84
E.G. of Mexico .55 .7 Pipeline/Tanker .87
C.G. of Mexico .53 5.7 Pipeline 1.00
W.G. of Mexico .13 2.3 Pipeline 1.00
S. California .9 1.5 Pipeline/Tanker 1.00
C & N California .5 .7 Tanker/Pipeline .99
S. Alaska Sale Area .1 .8 Pipeline/Tanker 1.00
N. Aleutian Shelf .3 1.3 Pipeline/Tanker .42
St. George Basin .4 2.2 Pipeline/Tanker .64
Navarin Basin .6 3.7 Pipeline/Tanker .76
Norton Sound .2 1.6 Pipeline/Tanker .57
Hope. Basin .1 .8 Pipeline/Tanker .24
Barrow Arch .3 1.0 Pipeline/Tanker .76
Diapir Field 1.7 8.9 Pipeline 1.00
Total OCS** 8.3 39.5
* In the FEIS for Lease Sale #82 this figure was significantly lower.
** Total OCS figures are calculated from OCS wide estimates and are not simply the
totals of planning area conditional estimates.
Source: US Bureau of Land Management 1982
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IImpacts
There are two major sources of impacts that are to be expected from
offshore oil development: the impacts associated with construction
and operation of exploration and production facilities (such as
disposal of drilling muds and fluids, noise, human waste, etc.) and
transport systems, and the impacts resulting from oil spills. Chronic
oil spillage fits into both categories, and although this problem was
not discussed in the 1980 Schedule EIS, this was remedied in the 1982
Schedule EIS. Offshore and coastal regions are affected by both types,
but some impacts (those affecting navigation and commercial fishing)
are restricted to only offshore areas.
Both EISs began their analysis by reviewing the general
environment of each planning area, next outlining the physical effects
that the environment would have on oil and gas development and then
looking at the resulting impacts that this development will have on the
environment. Table 7 lists the aspects of the environment covered in
the EISs for each planning area).
Table 7. Aspects of the Environment for which Impacts are Considered in
the Two Five-Year Schedule EISs
Marine environment Commercial fishing
Coastal ecosystems Sensitive areas/Areas of concern
Water quality and supply Endangered species
Navigation and shipping Recreation
Other uses of the OCS Air quality
Land use Historical/cultural resources
Socioeconomic systems Other management plans
Table 8 provides as an example one summary of the important
impacts likely to affect the North Atlantic if Alternative 1.1 of the 1982
Schedule was put into effect.
Perhaps the most important of all questions concerning OCS
oil and gas development are those concerned with the effects on ocean
and coastal ecosystems of both chronically discharged oil and large
single spills from offshore rigs and transport systems.
Chronic discharge of oil results as a regular part of daily oil well
operation, loading and offloading operations of tanker transport
(much less so with pipelines), ballast adjustment and tanker hold
cleaning processes. However, of the total amounts of oil released into
the world's oceans, insignificant fractions can be attributed to chronic
discharges. However, one Commentor [7] noted that chronic
discharges are increasing rapidly and that specific locations must be
considered rather than only the global average.
Estimates of the number of oil spills larger than 140 tons likely
to occur in each planning area were calculated in the 1980 Schedule
EIS using techniques described in the EISs for Sales #48 and #49 (Table
3). These calculations were based on analysis of past recorded spills but
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Table 8. An Example of the Summary Tables Given in the 1982 Schedule
FEIS for Offshore Activities in each Planning Area: North Atlantic
Level of Expected Impacts*
Scheduled Sales Only Cumulative Impacts from
Resource Category under Alternative 1.1 All Activities
1. General Impacts
a. Coastal Ecosystems moderate high
b. Water Quality and Supply
Water Quality low moderate
Water Supply low moderate
c. Navigation and Shipping high high
d. Other Uses of the OCS
Military Uses moderate moderate
NASA moderate moderate
Ocean Dumping moderate moderate
e. Land Use low low
Pipeline Landfalls low low
Gas Processing Plants moderate moderate
Service or Support Bases low low
f. Cultural Resources low low
2. Impacts of Special Concern
a. Commercial Fisheries moderate moderate
b. Endangered Species low high
c. Habitats and Resources of
Special Concern moderate moderate
d. Air Quality moderate high
e. Recreation
- Tourism moderate moderate
Sport Fishing low low
f. Socioeconomic Factors
Regional very low low
County moderate high
*Definitions of levels of impact are provided in the FEIS.
Source: US Bureau of Land Management 1982
failed to account for improvements in oil technology since the Santa
Barbara blowout, but also did not consider under-reporting which
may be large. These improvements and better modeling techniques
were used when recalculating the estimates for the 1981 Schedule EIS.
The environments of the planning areas differ markedly, and
this may affect the number of spills that each area could be expected to
receive. Curiously, however, the 1980 Schedule EIS stated that there
was no statistical basis for assuming that areas with more severe
environmental conditions would have more oil spills. This
unreferenced assertion was at odds with the number of spills predicted
for each area as a function of the number of wells to be drilled (Table 3).
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The nine areas expecting the most spills per well are all from Alaska,
and all nine expected an order of magnitude more spills per well than
in the Gulf of Mexico. By far the highest number are predicted for the
Chukchi Sea, where the severe winter conditions found everywhere in
Alaska are combined with the most difficult ice conditions. Even when
the more detailed calculations for the 1982 Schedule EIS are
considered, these areas remain the most vulnerable to spills both by
wells and during transportation.
Mitigation
In both documents, the number of spills and their effects were
calculated assuming, in part, adequate monitoring, enforcement of
regulations, spill containment and cleanup. In addition to
improvements in technology, enforcement of the regulations
governing OCS exploration and development operations had
improved since 1969. Effects of recent budget cuts and the Reagan
Administration policies of reduced regulation needed to be taken into
account in the 1982 Schedule EIS, however, and several reviewers of the
DEIS were concerned that there might not be adequate enforcement
under the expanded leasing program. DOI assured critics that
monitoring would be adequate as administered by the MMS and
accomplished by the following mechanisms:
" Exploration Plans
" Development and Production Plans
" Best Available and Safest Technologies Program
" Pooling and Unitization Program
" Air Quality Standards (EPA administered)
" OCS Operating Orders
" Structural Verification Program
" Inspection
" Stipulation Adherance Verification
Even when equipment and safety improvements are taken into
account, there remains a statistical probability of spills in each
planning area during the life of the Five-Year Schedule. Once a spill
has occurred, a number of factors influence the impact that it will have:
duration, discharge rate, location and type of spill (blowout, beneath
surface leak, surface spill).
Whether critical and sensitive resources will be affected by an oil
spill was indicated in the EIS to be highly uncertain and strongly
dependent on the timing of the spill and the degree of contact.
Differences in magnitude of effects make discussion of an "average"
spill meaningless, and the paucity of valid in situ observations of
effects made prediction of future impacts difficult for both of the EISs.
Impacts and the Alternatives
The 1982 Schedule FEIS tried to summarize the expected impacts over
the whole OCS as a way to compare the alternatives ihat hadTeen
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Table 9. OCS-Wide Comparison of Expected Impact Levels of All Alternatives
for the 1982 Schedule*
Hatats of Soc.o- SubCes e vem W a s Othe Caent o wral n"ds1.1sne  es cal Av oc s eor economic swentc
Aarnmm 4mye' ua.Y Supply _kao~eetn US"s Le"dUrn ftemurcss F~eneroe6 5550.55 Concern Gualiti Tourism Fsoos Cuhtures
I-1 L L M L VL-L L L-M L-M L-M M L L VL-L M
1-2 L L M L VL-L L L-M L-M L-M M L L VL-L M
If L L M L VL-L L L-M L-M L-M M L L VL-L M
1I1-1 L L L-M VL-L VL-L L L-M L L L-M L L VL-L M
IU-2 L L L-M VL-L VL-L L L-M L-M L L-M L L VL-L M
IV-ta L L M VL-L VL-L L L-M L L M L L VL-L L-M
N-1b L L M VL-L VL-L L L-M L L M L L VL-L L-M
IV-2a L VL-L L-M VL-L VL-L L L-M L L L-M L L VL-L L
IV-2b L VL-L L-M VL-L VL-L L L-M L L L-M L L VL-L L
Average impact levels in an OCS Plenning Areas
VIl-Verv High l-High M-Moderate L-Low VL-Very Low
Source: US Bureau of Land Management 1982
proposed. Table 9 indicates the results of this summation. The FEIS
pointed out that "being subjective [judgments of the analysts who
performed the impact analysis], the levels used in this table are
unquantifiable . . . [and] one or more planning areas within each
alternative may have been higher or lower expected impact levels" (US
Bureau of Land Management 1982). A careful reading of the impact
sections for each planning area indicates that many levels of
"Moderate" to "Very High" impact were recorded, leaving the reader
to wonder how averages as low as those indicated in Table 9 were
obtained.
A comparison of alternatives is also difficult "because higher
readings for a particular alternative in a particular resource category
may be balanced by lower readings in another" (US Bureau of Land
Management 1982). In the 1982 Schedule FEIS, Alternatives 111.1 and
111.2 were ranked as having the lowest expected impact levels and
Alternatives 1.1, 1.2 and II were ranked as having the highest.
Notes
1. Five-Year Schedules had also been produced by DOI prior to
OCSLAA; see Table 2 in the article by Stedman in this issue.
However, OCSLAA formalized the process and made review
mandatory.
2. Congress never took formal action on the proposed 1982 Five-Year
Schedule.
3. Citations in brackets indicate information from the Commentors
for this issue of EIA Review; see Appendices 1 and 2 in Stedman for
details.
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Final Environmental Impact Statement:
Proposed Federal/State Oil and Gas
Lease Sale for the Beaufort Sea
US Department of Interior
Bureau of Land Management
August 1979
The December 1979 Joint Federal/State Beaufort Sea Lease Sale
centered around a string of offshore barrier islands between the
Canning and Kaparuk Rivers of Alaska's north slope. One hundred
seventeen tracts (208,000 hectares) were assigned for lease of which 86
were sold for a total of S489,000,000 . An exploration drilling permit
was issued in August of 1981 and to date, two gravel islands have been
constructed, 14 exploratory wells drilled and one discovery announced
in May of 1982 (Figure 1).
SCOPE OF THE EIS
Geographical, Jurisdictional and Temporal
Location and State/Federal Dispute. Deliberation for holding a
Beaufort Sea lease sale began in November 1974 when both the state
an.d federal Lease Sale Plans listed the area for sales in 1976 and 1977.
As part of the National Petroleum Reserve Area (NPRA), the lease sale
area has been the subject of a jurisdictional disagreement between the
federal and Alaskan governments (Figure 2). Within the sale area
ownership consists of state (132,246 ha), federal (36,085 ha) and
disputed (39.769 ha) offshore tracts. Negotiations between the two
governments led to a Memorandum of Understanding in 1978 which
sought to ensure that uniform decisions and practices would avoid
differences in costs between the three ownership categories but which
delayed the sale until December 1979. Revenues from the disputed
tracts are currently being held in an escrow account pending a judicial
resolution of the conflict (Jackson and Kurz 1983).)
The lease sale area is immediately adjacent to Alaska's Prudhoe
Bay oil fields and development enclave, and activity there was also
expected to influence three nearby native communities (Barrow,
Nuiqsut, and Kaktovik) as well as the regional interests of the North
Slope Borough (Figure 2).
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Figure 1. The Joint Federal'State Beaufort Sea Lease Sale Area
Source: Jackson and Kurz 1983
Effects on the nearby Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and
proposed Beaufort Sea Marine Sanctuary were not discussed in detail
in the Final Envrionmental Impact Statement (FEIS) despite concern
over this omission by a number of people who reviewed the Draft EIS.
By way of explanation, the FEIS cited major uncertainties over future
plans for these areas. Similar reasons were given for not considering
possible effects on future oil and gas leasing by the Artic Slope
Regional Corporation which at that time had not found any reserves in
drilling tests on its holdings.
Phasing Schedule. The FEIS did not directly discuss a schedule of
expected exploration and development 'despite the relationship
existing between the anticipated impacts on the Arctic environment
and the length of time that oil and gas activities would be ongoing.
However, within the text, several conflicting figures for exploration
and development phases were used in discussing impacts. In one
instance the FEIS stated that five years of exploration and five years of
development were expected, in another, a "production" schedule of 18
years was discussed and a 20 to 26 year "field life" was indicated. How
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these times related to each other and to the expected impacts was not
explained. In one important departure from customary OCS practice
the leases were eventually sold for ten years rather than five (MMS
1983).
Analytical Considerations
Baseline Environment. In contrast to their extensive treatment of the
socioeconomic environment, which encompassed both current and
projected future trends (although without very much analysis), the
FEIS authors' handling of the physical and biological environment.
while also lengthy, covered the situation only at the time the FEIS was
being written. The document contains little discussion of expected
changes over time in the physical and biological environments.
perhaps because trends in weather cycles, climate, and animal and
plant populations are very difficult to assess and predict. Nevertheless.
there was considerable information on such trends available at the time
of writing which could have been used to inform the discussion of
long-term impacts, but which appears to have been overlooked.
The presentation of the existing quality of the socioeconomic
environment was also inadequate, but for different reasons. While
there was extensive description and documentation of both the cash
and subsistence economies of the region, there was little analysis of
how this translated into a "quality of life" for permanent North Slope
residents. More specifically, the description in the FEIS of how
previous oil and gas activity had changed economic and social
conditions did not stress cumulative impacts.
For longer-term socioeconomic impacts, models were used to
predict jobs, income, and levels of state and local revenues and
spending in the absence of the proposed activity. The time period
considered was the same as the expected life of the field. Here too, the
important issue of how these elements might affect the quality of life
for North Slope residents was not discussed.
Resiliency. This mostly static view of the baseline environments left
the FEIS with almost no analytical framework for considering either
the .short or long-term resiliency of the Arctic environment when
affected by various impacts.
Cumulative Impacts. In addition, cumulative impacts were
mentioned, only briefly and infrequently, and for only a few of the
environmental factors. Those cumulative impacts that were
mentioned were stated without reference to any analysis of resiliency
and environmental trends. Even the acknowledged expectation of
more oil and gas leasing in the future was not considered extensively.
ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THE FEIS ANALYSIS
Although never stated explicitly, there seemed to be an assumption in
the FEIS that since environmental trends (and therefore resiliency) are
so difficult to measure and document, there was no reason to portray a
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range of possible cumulative impacts. Overall, the environmental
assessment of the FEIS assumed'(and rightly so) that the physical and
biological quality of the Beaufort Sea environment was little reduced
from "wilderness" conditions. Only in the immediate vicinity of
Prudhoe Bay and the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS) has there
been significant humanly caused environmental change. There was
also the reasonable assumption that oil and gas development was the
only forseeable activity that would significantly affect the physical and
biological environments in the region.
Technical and Design Assumptions
The technical and design assumptions behind the Beaufort Sea lease
sale proposal were stated in more detail. Three of these technical
assumptions were central to the FEIS:
* There was an economically viable supply of oil and gas to be
exploited;
" There would be new onshore facilities constructed; and
* Impacts could occur in the lease area at any time during the
life of the field.
Although estimates of oil and gas potential for the NPRA were
admitted by the EIS to be "speculative", the possibility that the area
does not contain economic quantities of petroleum was not
considered. Table 1 contains the estimated amounts of available
resources; the intermediate case was considered "most likely" although
the probability of discovering any hydrocarbons in the lease area was
considered to be only 50 percent.
Table 1. Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources for the
Proposed Beaufort Sea Lease Area
Estimated Undiscovered Oil Gas
Recoverable Resources (Millions of Tons) (Trillions of cubic feet)
Miximuzm 171.4 3.125
"Most Likel- 107.1 1.625
Minimum 71.4 .875
The intermediate case was used as the basis for much of the FEIS
- a departure from the methodology of previous EIS. in which it was
assumed that maximum amounts of petroleum would be found in a
lease area. While the most probable impacts were thus given greater
attention in the Beaufort Sea EIS. emphasis on "worst case" impacts
was reduced in the document. It is these latter impacts which would
cause the greatest environmental damage when, and if, they occur, and
in the development EIS (which has yet to be written), such a "worst
case" analysis might be required.
For the purposes of analysis in the FEIS, numerous other
exploration and field development assumptions were used, based on
the predicted quantity of resources, likely production levels, financial
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viability and other technical variables. It was also suggested that a later
"development" phase EIS would be based on a more sure knowledge of
resources.
Operational Assumptions
Several major operational assumptions that directly relate to potential
impacts were also made by the FEIS:
" Life expectancy of the field was believed to be 20 to 28 years
while exploration drilling was to begin in 1981 and
production platforms were to be installed in 1985.
* Drilling from artificial islands would occur year-round.
" Mitigation of impacts would often be available by virtue of
existing federal and state laws, state and local regula tions and
land use controls. However, while other additional
mitigations were considered and discussed (especially in the
form of proposed Arctic OCS Orders). they were not assumed
for the FEIS since they had not been finalized at that time.
Based on the intermediate case, 24 exploration wells and 228
production wells were expected to be drilled. (There was some
inconsistency about this; a different section of the EIS indicated that
the number of expected wells would be 142 and yet another said that
there would only be 118.) These wells could be expected to produce or
require several types of materials that might affect the environment
(Table 2).
Oil Spill Assumptions
Some of the most important technical assumptions in the FEIS were
those concerning the probability of a major oil spill and the
subsequent travel of the slick. Spill statistics from the Gulf of Mexico
were consulted for estimates of these probabilities since, as the FEIS
stated, there were no other areas that had adequate histories of offshore
drilling for comparison. It was noted that the number of wells expected
for the Beaufort Sea was a full order of magnitude lower than the
number that had been drilled in the Gulf up to that time (228 versus
2,860), and the document pointed out that the extreme differences in
environmental conditions could mean that the probabilities of a
blowout might be underestimated. With these contradictions to
reconcile, the authors arrived at an assumption that one blowout
would occur during the life of the field. They then relied solely on the
Gulf statistics for the additional assumption that this spill would be
about 300 tons, the average spill in the Gulf. There was no analysis of
the correctness of this figure in light of the other comments in the FEIS
about the severity of the conditions in the Beaufort Sea lease area and
the difficulty of drilling a relief well during the extremely short open
water drilling season and near impossibility of doing so in the winter.
A spill of this size would cover about three square kilometers.
Other petroleum spills-due to platform fires, normal
operations, tanker accidents, platform pipe valves and oil in formation
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Table 2. Intermediate Case Quantities of Nonpetroleum Materials which may
Affect the Environment
Cleaned drill cuttings (100.000 n)
Dumped into the marine environment
Drilling muds (2.288.000 m3 )
Some dumped into the marine environment although reuse or recy cling
of drilling muds is common
Formation water (600,000 - 66.120,000 m3)
Transported to shore for cleaning and disposal, injected into disposal
wells, discharged into marine environment or a combination of these
Suspended sediments (100.000 M 3 )
Resuspended from pipeline burial or gravel island construction
Gravel (1.300.000 M3 on 154 ha)
Dredged for island construction
Pipeline (13.6 km on 19 ha)
Mostly buried
water - were all assumed to be minimal. Pipeline accidents were also
assumed to be minor but the probability of pipeline structures being
destroyed by ice was not specifically analysed except to document areas
where ice gouging was expected to be the most common.
Based on the Beaufort Sea Oil Spill Trajectory (BSOST), most
oil spills were expected to move parallel to the coastline with direction
being dependent on the prevailing winds. The BSOST itself included
many assumptions but several were critical:
* Winds and upper level currents drive oil slicks.
* There are steady state winds (not often true for westerlies).
9 Spills within one half kilometer of the shoreline will spread
enough to hit the beach.
e There will be no spill containment.
Weathering effects on spills were not taken into account.
- Above normal formation pressures are known to exist in the
eastern third of the lease area, and this area was therefore assumed to
have a slightly higher risk of spill and subsequent impact. An
additional and important assumption was made that there would not
be effective cleanup in the case of a spill.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED SALE
Although five alternatives were listed in the FEIS. there was no detailed
assessment made of what effect these alternatives might have on the
environment of the region. Instead, since the lease sale was considered
part of a larger federal governmental strategy for achieving energy
independence, the emphasis of the EIS in its review of the alternatives
was to consider what could be done in place of the proposal that would
still help meet the nation's goals.
With drau'a I of the Sale. This would have reduced oil and gas activity in
the area (for the short term) and postponed conflicts with other users of
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the region, particularly with the local subsistence economies and the
proposed National Marine Sanctuary. However, possible
replacements for the sale were generally not considered viable.
Conservation, use of existing oil supplies, increasing use of alternative
resources (coal, nuclear power, oil shale, hydro and solar) and increases
in imports were each discussed and their possible national impacts
described.
Block Deletion Alternatives. Deleting blocks associated with the
boulder patch community (nine percent of the total lease area) would
have reduced habitat change but a spill from nearby blocks could still
have affected this area. Deleting blocks seaward of the barrier islands to
protect against ice hazards would have eliminated 33 percent of the
lease area from consideration and would have included all of the
disputed federal blocks and all blocks of low industry interest. This
included the nearshore section of the fall bowhead whale migration
route, and the potential for oil spills caused by moving ice would
probably have been reduced. Still, the area was considered much less
significant as a bird and fish habitat and for subsistence use than those
areas inside the islands. Deleting blocks of specific seal haulout areas
was not expected to add significantly to their protection. Deletion of
blocks in the area thought to have "abnormally high" formation
pressures was not considered as an alternative despite the greater risk of
a spill in this area.
Delay Alternatives. Delay of the proposed lease sale was suggested to
allow time for research on whales, proposals for a National Marine
Sanctuary (NMS), and the North Slope Borough's Coastal
Management Plan (CMP) to be completed. It was believed that the
estimates of impact on whales would probably be the same even after
research was finished; that the NMS regulations would be no more
strict than those already being considered for the leasing area
(although there was no discussion of what would occur if neither were
implemented); and that the CMP was essentially in effect already
(embodied within the Alaska state CMP) and could be officially
implemented as development progressed.
POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
Potential environmental impacts were reported in the FEIS in two
different ways: first, the effects that the physical environment was
likely to have on the proposed oil and gas activity, both technically and
operationally, and second, the impacts that this activity was likely to
have on the biological and socio-economic environment of the lease
area (these impacts are often caused by the physical effects).
Potential natural hazards of the region include shore erosion,
storm surges, higher than normal oil and gas formation pressures,
river flooding over both land and ice, and melting of permafrost. In
addition, "zones of grounded pressure ridges or ice islands, zones of ice
gouging of the seabed (Figure 3), zones [affected] by the pack ice.
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floating fast ice, polynyas and the inner margin of the shorefast ice,
mainland or island shorelines, and both compressive and shearing
forces exerted by sea ice represent the major potential for natural sea ice
hazards for development" (US Bureau of Land Management 1979).
The primary factors which were expected to lead to impacts on
the environment were large accidental oil spills, chronic hydrocarbon
and heavy metal discharges, construction activities, disposal of
drilling muds and cuttings and operations noise.
Geology
Land. The lease sale area is located on the outer continental shelf
(OCS) in shallow water, in most places no deeper than 15 meters,
which is an extension of the onshore coastal plain. This plain is almost
entirely permafrost terrain transected by northern flowing rivers.
Under the permafrost is poorly sorted clay, silt, sand and gravel. The
shorelines are being actively deposited as well as eroded. The nearshore
OCS is generally thin, overconsolidated clay, 10 to 30 m thick, with
shoals of sand and gravel around the offshore islands.
The availability of terrestrial gravel for construction is limited,
but supplies are reported in the FEIS to be larger within the OCS, and
while there is considerable overburden, it is generally unfrozen
beneath seawater deeper than 1.5 meters.
Figure 3. Hanging ke Keels Source: Milne and Herlinveaux n.d.
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Gravel. The FEIS reported that the least ecologically sensitive
terrestrial sites for gravel are thaw lakes more than one kilometer
inland and deeper than two meters (although this is arguable [6]). Most
subtidal surface gravel sites were regarded as ecologically "acceptable"
since these areas are low in benthic fauna and experience disturbance
from ice gouging similar to that which would occur from dredging.
The vast majority of available gravel is covered with productive mud
overburden, and the depressions created by dredging in these areas
were expected to take several decades to recover. (These points in the
FEIS were questioned by Commentors [6, 16].)
Water. Fresh water is found in ''shallow" ponds, "deep" thaw lakes.
small meandering streams, wide braided rivers and groundwater. Only
surface water deeper than two meters does not freeze completely in
winter. Groundwater found in alluvial aquifers associated with large
rivers or lakes is considered of good quality, and has generally not been
affected by human activities. Fresh water requirements are expected to
be between six and 60 million gallons per year at peak production
depending on which production estimate was being considered. While
there is expected to be adequate supply, care must be taken not to
deplete large under-ice river pools of freshwater which are critical for
overwintering fish.
Permafrost. Offshore permafrost, often old and ice-bonded or highly
saline, may melt as a result of industrial activity, just as terrestrial
permafrost does. While too little is known about marine permafrost to
make accurate predictions about how it will react to offshore activities,
it must be taken carefully into account, especially for those wells
producing "hot" oil.
Climate
Temperatures range from a high of 5 degrees centigrade in summer
down to about -30*C in winter with an annual mean of about -12*C.
The lease area is relatively dry, averaging 12.6 cm of rain per year plus a
water equivalent of 76.2 cm of snow (much of it coming in September).
Winds are quite consistent in direction and speed: easterly winds, from
May. through December and westerlies from January to April with
mean velocities of about 20 km/h and a range of 15 to 25 km/hr.
Cloudy weather prevails from February to October and there is
extensive fog from May to September. Ice accumulates more rapidly
during periods of lower temperatures and higher winds.
Physical Oceanography
Depths, Tides and Currents. Depths of the OCS in the lease area range
from two to eight m inside the barrier islands and to as much as 20 m on
the seaward side. Ice usually freezes to the bottom at depths of two m or
less.
Open water currents are strongly wind-driven and in shallow
areas the bottom topography is an added determining factor. Current
velocities range from 18 cm/sec to 23 cm/sec with westerly currents
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being the stronger. In winter, westerly currents under the ice travel at
only five cm 'sec.
Astronomical tides are mixed semidiurnal and have only a very
small mean range of 10 to 30 cm. Wind-produced waves are limited by
ice and, especially within the lease area, by the barrier islands. Normal
waves reach only about 50 cm in height but can range from one to three
meters during normally short storms.
Wind and tidal erosion, while generally not a serious problem,
can be extensive during storms and may be critical for facilities built
close to shore, especially those on barrier or artificial islands. Storm
surges will require that drilling islands have protective gravel
formations around them to protect against large waves, erosion and ice
overriding (although other approaches such as stacked ridge may be
used [6]).
Ice. Of course ice is the greatest threat to oil and gas activities in the
Arctic. Many of the oil and ice interactions can lead to serious impacts
on the environment.
Winter ice in the Beaufort Sea is divided into zones of fast
(attached) and pack ice which are in turn subdivided into sub-zones
relating to the ice's physical characteristics. Except for the band of
"bottom-fast" ice attached to shore, the Beaufort Sea ice is in nearly
constant motion caused by meteorological and oceanographic events
in the Arctic Ocean. In the eastern Arctic this ice circulation is
clockwise and is known as the Beaufort Gyre.
Table 3 shows the annual cycle of ice formation and
deterioration. Rate of ice growth is determined by air and sea
temperature moderated by snow cover.
In fall, freezing begins with randomly oriented crystals forming
flat sheets which may turn to slush when influenced by agitation and
changing temperatures. During formation very little salt is
incorporated into ice. Most of the salt is rejected and forms brine
pockets, some later being pushed upward into "snow ice" and the rest
downward through "brine channels". During the winter, ice thickness
increases, moderated by insulative snow cover of variable thickness. In
spring, breakup begins with melting ice surfaces where water filled
melt ponds appear. Leads form in weak ice structures, usually in the
floating pack extension, and as days lengthen and temperatures rise,
this floating pack ice breaks into floe ice. Ice remaining through the
summer becomes multiyear ice when it takes on new formation ice in
the fall.
Ice cover distribution varies considerably by season. In summer,
only the pack ice remains. Its edge is near the barrier islands so that it
can be driven over and around them by summer storms. which also
deposit ice on the mainland. More routinely, westerly winds gradually
drive the pack toward shore and easterly winds drive it far out into the
Arctic Ocean. During freezup, a zone of interaction is established
between land fast ice and the pack ice.
The annually reoccuring land fast ice zone consists of (1)
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Annual Ice Cycle Within the Nearshore Area
I new ice formation - late September, early October
II first continuous fast-ice sheet - mid to late October
Unstable outside bays and the barrier islands
III extension and modification of fast ice - November to February
No direct observations by R. Barry cover this period. The
general sequence involves:
* seaward progression of the ice edge
* ridging of successive ice edges
* incursions of older ice
* grounded ice masses, formed in situ or driven shoreward
IV stable land fast ice inside about the 15 - meter isobath -
November, December
V stable ice inside about the 30 - meter isobath - depending on
geographic location and time of year - March, April, May
VI estuarine flooding of ice - late May
VII melt pond formation on ice - early June
VIII melting and weakening of ice - June (attached ice decays
May, June)
IX breakup - late June to August
X open water in favorable years - August, September
Some deep - draft older ice and ridge fragments remain
in the nearshore zone.
Source: Barry. et al. 1977 as reported in US Bureau of Land Management 1979.
bottom-fast ice which is continously in contact with the sea floor and
shoreline and is bounded by active tidal cracks and (2) by floating fast
ice which extends out to the grounded ice ridges, much of it lying
inside the barrier islands. In winter there is little movement of this ice
along the shore but extensive movement during breakup results
eventually in its disintegration. Although safe for travel in winter,
dangerous tension cracks do occur and the ridge/stamukhi zone is
unstable.
While the generally limited ice movement of bottom fast ice
makes it preferred for drilling, protective "moats" of open water must
still be kept around the drill string, especially in spring, and blowout
prevemters (BOPs) must be located below the mud line (Figure 4). In
areas of floating floe ice, there is much more movement and therefore
more difficulty and hazards for drilling. A conservative boundary for
this zone (at the 15 m isobath) was suggested by the FEIS, beyond
which drilling was not recommended. The same precautions as
indicated for bottom fast ice need to be taken in this zone, but here only
artifical islands and gravel barges are likely to be able to withstand the
ice movements and will need to be enhanced by gravel berms.
Pack ice is attached in winter to the grounded ice ridges which
stabilize the ice and can help prevent the pack from moving onshore
during spring breakup.
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Table 3.
Extensive mass and movement of the pack ice is a severe
restriction to drilling, but artificial gravel islands could be used out to
the 20 m isobath if provided with protection from being overridden.
All parts of the lease area which experience extensive ice
movement are subject to ice gouging (Figure 3). Especially in the
pressure ridge and floating pack zones, pipelines must be buried deeply
enough to avoid biing broken.
Other Elements. Other Beaufort Sea oceanographic parameters vary
considerably as well. Beyond the OCS, the water is very clear of
sediment, but shallow water areas are seasonally turbid from river
runoff and storm wave action. Runoff and ice heterogeneity also create
variable water temperatures. Underwater noise is common including
loud but infrequent ice cracking and grinding, biological sounds of all
sorts, and low frequency noise from terrestrial construction and well
drilling.
Chemical Oceanography
Salinity and Elements. Salinity of the nearshore can vary considerably
from less than 25 parts per thousand (ppt) during the spring river
runoff to over 80 ppt in some lagoons, often caused by flushing of
saline pockets. Dissolved oxygen is usually high - about eight ml 02/1
although extensive ice cover or restricted circulation can lower it
considerably.
Since there is limited ocean upwelling in the area, the major
limiting factors on primary production are nitrogen and phosphorus.
These generally come from terrestrial sources through river discharge.
Contaminants. Background concentrations of contaminants-
chromium, lead, iron, zinc, cadmium and barium, as well as
petroleum derivatives -are highly variable. However, these materials
are reported to be "acceptable" for open water, presumably based on an
averaging of recorded values. Emphasis in the FEIS is placed on efforts
to determine prelease levels of hydrocarbons for comparison with later
OCS activity to ensure that oil from the few prelease spills will not be
attributed to leasing activity.
Air and water quality are reported to be excellent. Although
additional pollution of any kind could reduce this quality
significantly, the FEIS indicated that enforcement of state and federal
standards would keep impacts within acceptable limits. No evidence
was cited that these standards were being enforced under existing
conditions. Although the difficulties of properly treating sewage in the
Arctic were described, the recommendation that sewage be discharged
into the marine environment was made without analysis of the
possible consequences.
POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON THE BIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT
The documentation of the Beaufort Sea's biological characteristics in
the FEIS is by necessity limited to those elements directly relevant to
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Figure 4. Drillship system showing method of protection against bottom
scouring by ice.
assessing magnitude and likelihood of impacts from oil spills and
other oil-related activity. Within this framework the FEIS gives an
overview of the arctic ecosystem with an emphasis on its relatively
short but very productive "bloom" period in June, July and August. In
addition, the FEIS takes pains to remind the reader that impacts for any
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given species depend on many factors, of which the most important
are:
" the specific organism involved,
" the type and amount of petroleum,
" the interaction of the organism with the petroleum,
* time and location of the spill,
" distribution of ice,
" direction and velocity of currents and winds,
* presence of other pollutants,
" aging or weathering of the petroleum, and
" the method of spill control.
It is the variability of these elements which makes prediction of effects
so difficult.
Terrestrial Habitats and Landscapes. The coastal tundra is covered
with lakes and streams (as much as 95 percent of the area in some
places) and displays extensive polygonal fissuring which results in
series of steppe-like marshes. In exposed areas, mosses and lichens
predominate, interspersed with cotton grass and sedges, cranberry and
heath. In low lying areas and stream beds, shrub willows and birch
grow to heights equal to the depths of the depressions.
Although the impact of oil spills on terrestrial vegetation is not
expected to be more severe along the Beaufort Sea coast than it would
be further south, low air and soil temperatures will keep biological
activity low and the effects on existing plant tissues will be immediate
and irreversible. In tests, oil has killed vegetation and reduced flower
and seed production. Areas of heavy plant death are subject to serious
erosion and are slow to recover. Construction of facilities will also
significantly change about 225 ha of land.
Wetlands. The Beaufort Sea coast is intersected often by streams and
rivers which, along with storm erosion, deliver spring pulses of
nutrients to delta lagoons, marshes and ocean nearshore areas. Larger
rivers are critical to nesting waterfowl since they temporarily isolate
islands which protect the birds from predation. These deltas are also
essential for overwintering of many fish species.
In contrast to terrestrial ecosystems, northern salt marshes are
believed to be much more sensitive to oil than those further south. Oil
reaching the root systems of marsh plants will inhibit germination,
reduce oxygen uptake and destroy tissue. Approximately 450 ha of
marsh area are thought to be at risk during a typical oil spill. Bays,
estuaries, and lagoons are also very much at risk. In all four of these
habitats, oil can remain in bottom sediments for as many as four to 10
years and longer, chronically affecting plant roots and allowing
sediment particles to move, spreading the oil to new locations.
Benthic Habitats. Offshore, rows of sand and gravel barrier islands run
parallel to the shore, absorbing incoming waves and ice and enclosing
shallow lagoons and bays. Usually less than four meters deep, these
shallow water zones are very productive, providing planktonic food for
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fish and birds. As a result these zones are the most important harvest
areas for human subsistence. All users of the lagoons are seasonal since
they are covered by landfast ice most of the year.
The nearshore benthos is annually gouged by ice floes and is
therefore dominated by opportunistic, early successional species.
Greater species diversity and a tenfold increase in biomass over inshore
areas is the result. The FEIS reported that the area outside the stamukhi
zone is more stable but not as productive as nearshore and lagoon
benthic communities. For the most part the lease area is soft muddy
bottom but includes several unique boulder patches which harbor a
great deal of kelp. The ecological importance of these distributionally
restricted kelp communities is not known.
The modelled probability of boulder patch vegetation being
affected by a spill is about 10 percent. The FEIS indicated that the
literature on the effects of oil pollution on these kelp species is limited,
but some animals are known to use them as grazing and egglaying
substrates. Young macrophytes (algae) are considered the most
sensitive. Increased turbidity, added overburden from construction
dredging, and the dumping of drill cuttings may smother or prevent
photosynthesis.
Plankton. Primary production in open water is generally low but can
be concentrated in small local pockets. It is rapid in spring inside ice
leads which are critical foraging areas for marine mammals and birds.
Although not exceptionally abundant, epontic algae may be critical in
early spring for adding to productivity of these leads.
An intermediate sized spill is not expected to change
phytoplanktonic production or species composition very much,
although a small bloom could occur at the edge of a slick due to the
added nutrients in the area. Dilution of chronically spilled oil is
expected to minimize any damage from this source. Construction may
affect . phytoplankton by changing water circulation patterns
resuspending nutrients and sediments. The cumulative affect of these
impacts was not given very much consideration in the FEIS.
Large Invertebrates. Macro-invertebrates also vary considerably in
abundance both seasonally and annually. At depths of five to 10 m, the
FEIS reported that 70 to 80 percent of the species are polychaete worms,
although 75 percent of the biomass consists of mostly inedible
echinoderms.
High mortality of some benthic organisms can be expected
immediately after an oil spill, decreasing thereafter with time and
water depth. As noted above, the effects were expected to be especially
pronounced in enclosed, shallow areas, where oil can concentrate in
sediment. Although specific information concerning the Arctic was
lacking, other studies suggest that both filter and detritus feeding
organisms, especially clams, will be affected. Some clams are known to
accumulate hydrocarbons and may do the same with heavy metals,
particularly from formation water discharges. Recovery of clam beds
may take at least seven years and probably longer to recover.
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Crustaceans, while mobile, are generally more sensitive than
molluscs, but vary widely in their responses to spilled oil.
Echinoderms are believed to be highly sensitive since they require
especially high quality water.
Larvae of all species are especially sensitive (10 to 100 times
more than adults), though eggs are partially protected by their outer
covering. Intertidal organisms are very restricted in the Arctic by ice
scouring and the expected impact on them is regarded as minimal.
Dredging, pipeline construction and deposition of drill
cuttings are all expected to cause short-term smothering of benthic
organisms near the areas of activity-a 17 to 30 m radius from each
platform, and 50 m on either side of pipelines. Recovery could take up
to five years.
Corals, while not numerous, are a special feature of the area and
of special concern to the FEIS. However, little was known about toxic
or smothering effects on these boulder patch organisms. Subarctic
corals are known to respond poorly to turbidity, smothering, and
hydrocarbon contamination.
Amphipods and other epibenthic crustaceans are the most
important prey items for large fish and birds, especially during periods
of summer inshore blooms. The EIS stated that at these times their
abundance is one to two orders of magnitude larger than the
consumption requirements of their predators, but gave no
documentation for this claim. It did note, however, that these macro-
planktonic blooms are not uniformly or consistently distributed from
year to year.
Fish. Despite the relatively low biomass of fish (and invertebrates) in
the Beaufort Sea as compared to other Alaskan oil planning areas,
there are more than thirty species of fish recorded for nearshore areas of
the lease sale area, of which five are important because of abundance
and/or human use: Arctic and least cisco, Arctic char, fourhorned
sculpin and Arctic cod. Fish use nearshore habitats for feeding and
reproduction during open water periods; delta areas have the largest
species diversity.
Anadromous fish, especially, stay close to the mainland shore
and some overwinter in rivers and deep lakes. Marine species and
certain life cycle stages of anadromous species (which may take up to
ten years to reach maturity) are year-round salt water residents and rely
on unfrozen areas of river deltas to overwinter. These areas are
especially sensitive to disruption because usually several year classes
are found together in a pocket and whole populations could be
eliminated at one time.
During periods of ice cover, Arctic cod is almost the entire diet of
ringed seals and is therefore important to polar bears and Arctic fox,
which rely on the ringed seals for food, and to humans, which hunt
them for pelts.
More than seventy species are known from offshore areas in
summer of which the most abundant are Arctic cod, Canadian eelpout
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and twohorn sculpin. Some marine species may also migrate far
offshore in winter (but there was little information on this, according
to the FEIS).
The effects of spilled oil on fish are complicated by variability in
season, fish species involved, types of oil, contradictory test results (see
Lahey and Lechine, this issue). Effects on fish larvae would be very
similar to those on other macro-plankton. In the Arctic, however,
specific ecological habitats are thought to be especially vulnerable to
oil toxicity: overwintering pockets in both fresh and nearshore marine
waters. shallow, enclosed breeding areas and ice leads in spring.
Overwintering areas are also vulnerable to water removal, high
biological oxygen demand, and turbidity.
Construction, dredging and drill cuttings deposition are a
threat to spawning and feeding habitat. Facilities, once built, may also
change local water temperature, current patterns and salinity thereby
affecting migration. However this is expected for only about 0.1 per
cent of the fish habitat in the lease area.
Disposal of dredge material during winter could concentrate
discharges into small local areas. Many of these pockets are critical to
overwintering for some fish species and effects could be very disruptive
to these populations.
Overall the impacts on fish were not considered by the FEIS to
be extensive or long-lasting.
Birds. Only six species of birds are considered to be permanent
residents in the lease area, but during the intense summer period 163
migratory species have been identified. Most follow the coastal
migratory route (out to about 10 km offshore), using deltas and ice
leads most extensively in early spring and feeding on plankton near the
ice edge.
Summer feeding shorebirds concentrate on small crustaceans,
whereas open water feeders, like gulls, feed mainly on arctic cod, large
crustaceans and molluscs (especially out beyond the barrier islands).
Island lagoons are also important feeding areas for gulls, ducks and
terns. Geese are particularly abundant on isolated river delta islands.
(Howe Island has the only known snow goose colony in Alaska.) The
barrier islands seem less important for shorebirds in mid summer but
have the highest concentrations of these birds just prior to fall
migration.
The amount of ice cover contributes to determining the
numbers of birds in an area by dictating the amount of open water, but
also by providing roosting areas and substrate for epitonic
phytoplankton (although little is known about how these algae
contribute to the arctic food webs).
The peregrine falcon, an endangered species when the FEIS was
written, does not breed in the lease area but does spend some time
feeding along the coastline. Peregrines are not likely to be affected by
oil and gas activity.
Waterfowl and shorebirds may be the most vulnerable of all
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animals in the arctic to impacts of oil and gas activity, and the FEIS
reported that some populations were expected to decline as a result of
the proposal (this was disputed by one Commentor as not supportable
by the available evidence [6]). The birds depend upon the vulnerable
shallow enclosed shore areas for food and shelter. Their acute need for
warmth from feathers make these birds especially sensitive to oil
pollution from both chronic and large accident sources. Fouling of
feathers generally results in death. Flocking and diving or swimming
birds are particularly likely to contact spilled oil.
While there would be less impact during winter, oil spilled
during fall or spring migration would probably be encountered by
many more birds using ice leads and beaches. Many birds using shore
edge and barrier island habitats for nesting and molting will also be
likely to contact spilled oil in summer time (especially hatchlings).
Human disturbance (especially aircraft noise) may cause
displacement, nesting failure and possibly increased predation on less
tolerant species (and individuals). Snow geese and tundra swans were
reported to be particularly sensitive. Much of the disturbance will
occur during ice-free periods when avian activity is also at its peak.
About 230 ha of coastal habitat is expected to be taken up by
construction of facilities, some of which could also force changes in
migration routes.
Predictions of the effects of oil activities is made almost
impossible by the variability of bird densities from year to year and by
the lack of information on the extent to which alternative habitat can
be utilized by displaced animals.
Terrestrial Mammals. The large terrestrial herbivores which spend the
summer near the lease area were reported in the FEIS to be muskox,
caribou, moose and Dall's sheep (Commentors [6, 16] contended, in
contrast, that only caribou are found near the lease area in significant
numbers). These animals are preyed upon by humans, wolves and
occasionally grizzly bears. The carrion from these kills are shared by
broadly omniverous bears, wolverines, and arctic foxes. all of which
take smaller mammals as well. Polar bears, however, eat a great many
seals and are the only mammals to den on ice as well as on land.
Denning habitat for polar bears, reported by the FEIS to be in
short supply (this is disputed by Commentor [6]), could be further
reduced and restricted to more unstable pack ice by direct interactions
with humans and noise. An oil spill could be especially injurious to
these animals by reducing the insulative capacity of their fur. Despite
these anticipated problems, the FEIS concluded that the international
treaty which commits the US to protect polar bears and their habitat
will not be violated by the proposal.
Marine Mammals. Spotted seals, beluga, gray and bowhead whales are
all seasonal marine migrants to the Beaufort Sea; permanent residents
are ringed and bearded seals. Ringed seals are usually found close to
shore in the land fast ice zone, but the densities found in the lease area
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vary markedly from year to year. Pups are born in late March or April
and molting occurs in May to July during which time feeding is
reduced and blubber is metabolized. Intense feeding follows this period
and the seals concentrate on fish, crustaceans and molluscs. Bearded
and spotted seals follow similar patterns but move greater distances
and often have their pups away from the Beaufort Sea area.
The FEIS stated that although gravel islands may benefit seals
by providing additional haulout areas after they are abandoned by
humans, the negative effects of disturbance would be far greater (this
was disputed by Commentor [6]). Abandonment of haulout areas and
rookeries is possible, especially if these areas are hit by spilled oil.
Generally, adult seals seem to be able to tolerate oil on their skin and on
their fur without serious damage, but pups may have more difficulty
especially if ingesting hydrocarbons while nursing, and oiled pups
have been shown to weigh less than nonoiled pups in areas where spills
have occurred.
Bowhead and gray whales, because they are endangered species
and critical to Inupiat culture, received special attention in the FEIS.
One of four populations worldwide, Beaufort Sea bowhead whales
migrate from the Bering Sea each March to June, through the Bering
Strait and near Alaska's north slope coast while on their way to eastern
Beaufort feeding grounds. They move into the lease area in late
summer and early fall.
Population estimates for the Bering Sea stock of bowhead
whales ranged from 1,783 to 2,865 at the time of the FEIS, although the
Inupiat believed that there were more. Despite the acknowledgment in
the FEIS that most elements of bowhead biology, ecology and behavior
were largely unknown or in dispute, suggestions made to delay the sale
until several previously initiated studies were finished were not
seriously considered.
Effects of oil spills and oil-related activities on bowhead whales
were stated in the FEIS to be unknown. This opinion included effects
on bowhead prey items, despite the fact that these organisms (macro-
plankton, - small fish, benthic tunicates, and vegetation) were
extensively discussed in other sections of the FEIS. Noise from drilling,
seismic testing and transportation, was also a major concern of the
FEIS, but while there were some reports of bowhead diving in response
to aircraft, there was little good information at the time. Effects of oil
on baleen, skin and breathing were equally unknown. Although
spring migration was thought to occur far offshore, it is possible that
some spring leads could appear in the lease area. Bowheads were
thought to be most likely to be found in the lease area in fall, but there
was dispute over which parts of the lease area was deep enough to
accomodate them.
A worst case scenario was presented in the FEIS for "a large
volume, continous oil spill which could interact with migrator
[bowhead] whales", and whose probability of occurence was
considered to be "extremely low".
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In discussing the gray whale, the FEIS shakes the reader's
confidence in its scientific accuracy and insight by observing that grays
are in the family Eschrichtius robustus, whereas these two names are
the genus and species for this whale. Nevertheless, the gray whale life
cycle is outlined in some detail. They are found only occasionally in
the lease area and their diet there was reported in the FEIS to be similar
to that of the bowheads (although this is not the current
understanding). The FEIS reported the Arctic gray whale population
in 1970 to be about 11,000 and indicated that there were no
scientifically justifiable data concerning oil impacts on gray whales.
POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ENVIRONMENT
State-wide Socioeconomic Conditions
Figure 5 shows population changes for Alaska since 1900. Population,
employment, revenue sources and spending were considered by the
FEIS to be the most important socioeconomic considerations at the
state level. Because of the large distances between population centers,
however, other sociological and economic trends were more
meaningfully discussed at the regional and local levels.
Most Alaskan employment is concentrated in governmental
and other services. Also important is construction (despite the
reportedly mild decline following completion of the Transalaskan
Pipeline System), mining, and food and timber processing. Total 1978
state GNP was four billion dollars with two billion dollars in
expenditures attributable to government. Although the federal portion
of this had stabilized, the state portion was continuing to grow.
Cutbacks in 1978 construction earnings were softened by a large
reduction in nonresidential outflows, especially in the oil industry.
Despite being the primary export industry, much of oil-generated
income was recognized to drive other state sectors -transportation,
financial, trade and services -and was therefore considered central to
z
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the state's economic health. Other exogenous industries are
government (especially federal) and the small but growing areas of fish
and food processing, lumber production and tourism.
The proposal was expected to add only 2.2 per cent to the total
population of Alaska by the year 2000.
Regional Socioeconomic Conditions
The primary social impacts of the proposed lease sale were expected to
most strongly affect the traditional villages of Barrow, Nuiqsut and
Kaktovik in addition to the oil and gas enclave at Prudhoe
Bay / Deadhorse. Secondary effects were expected to be felt by the North
Slope Borough (NSB) as a whole and also in Anchorage and Fairbanks.
Population in the traditional communities rose 140 percent
from 1939 to 1970 and 158 percent from 1970 to 1977. Most of this
increase resulted from development of Prudhoe Bay oil and the
building of TAPS. In 1979, the final year of declining construction
activity on the pipeline, population in NSB fell 27 percent, a trend of
critical importance since NSB has its tax collection and operations
revenue tied to a $1500 per capita formula.
In 1970, 83 percent of the NSB population was Inupiate; by 1977
it was only 42 percent. Ninety percent of all residents of oil
construction camps were nonInupiat. Growth of the government and
education job sector also brought many nonInupiat to the area, many
of them to Barrow, where government, school district and Arctic Slope
Regional Corporation central offices are located. As of 1977, however,
Prudhoe Bay had over half of the NSB population. Metropolitan
Anchorage (population about 200,000) is the trade, petroleum service
and financial center of Alaska and has grown steadily this century with
cycles of booms and stable periods. The Anchorage area was in a minor
down period during the production of the EIS, which predicted a four
percent employment growth to 1980. The city was believed to be in a
position to absorb 15,000 new residents without new construction but
the construction industry was believed to still be healthy enough, to
build whatever was necessasary beyond that.
In Fairbanks, completion of TAPS resulted in sharply high
unemployment, especially in construction (8,000 jobs lost in the
period 1977-78) with much slower growth predicted for the future.
Here, too, the housing industry was considered strong enough to
support any oil-related growth.
The region most likely to be affected by Beaufort Sea oil activity
was reported to be the North Slope Borough (NSB). In contrast to the
state as a whole, local government was reported to predominate here.
Trade and service sectors were relatively underdeveloped, and mining,
especially for oil and gas was obviously significant.
Unemployment for the NSB was very low (3.7 percent in 1976),
but the figure was seen as misleading by the EIS since many workers
leave the area when their jobs run out. Unemployment in traditional
communities was sometimes very high.
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Much of the dramatic increase in employment in the mid-1970s
was due to TAPS; insured employment rose 1730 percent between 1970
and 1974 (outside the Barrow labor area). Taxes on this mining activity
(oil and gas mostly) support much of the local government labor force
as well. Average family income in traditional villages ranged from
$8,560 to S22.670 between 1972 and 1975, and stood at $12,000 in 1978.
Still there were many very low-income people. A number of these
continued to pursue a subsistence hunting and fishing lifestyle.
Incomes within the oil and gas enclaves were much higher and
generally not diminished by the region's high living costs since
workers' families generally live outside the region.
For most Inupiat of the region, a subsistence hunting and
fishing economy was reported to predominate and was expected by the
FEIS to be important for the foreseeable future. While each village has
a primary dependence on different animals (Table 4), all are reported
to utilize sea mammals, fish, caribou and other terrestrial mammals to
some degree. In recent years drastic declines in bowhead and caribou
herd stocks have necessitated restrictions on yearly harvests.
Oil and gas activities have caused great concern among the
Inupiat of the region, despite the oil-related revenues that accrue to
them. These concerns result from the larger cultural role of subsistence
in daily life and the recent movement toward a cash economy. All
subsistence activities, but especially whaling, are "governed by
patterns of cooperation and an elaborate structure of sharing and
distributing, [serving] to integrate the community socially and
culturally." (US Bureau of Land Management 1979). Maintenance of a
subsistence economy was also reported to reduce dependence on a
somewhat uncertain cash economy and delay (or help prevent)
assimilation into mainstream American urbanized culture.
"The general impact of the proposal on a subsistence lifestyle
may be to reduce the numbers of some species during some years ... [so
that] hunting may need to be curtailed on some species for a time to
allow for population recovery." In addition, it was expected that there
would be an increase in the "rate of social change towards western
val ues. .. and a decrease in subsistence food gathering and the related
cultural values." "From testimony given at the hearings, it appears the
Inupiat and western cultures are on a collision course." (US Bureau of
Land Management).
Local Socioeconomic Conditions
While perhaps not truly necessary. the large amount of detail given in
the FEIS for each of the Beaufort Sea coast communities is
understandable since these communities were expected to receive the
bulk of the effects of the lease sale activities. (Much of this detail is
omitted from this summary.)
Barrou' -- (1979 Population: 2,800; 90 percent Inupiat). Between 1970
and 1975 nonagricultural employment rose more than 100 percent,
especially in the government sector (389 percent). Unemployment
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Table 4. Biota Resource Summary
Resource Barrow Nuiqsut Kaktoiik
Bowhead Whale 1 2 1
Beluga Whale 2 2 2
Seal 2 2 2
Uqruk 1 2 2
Walrus 2 0 0
Polar Bear 2 9
Caribou I I
Moose 1 2
Sheep NA NA I
C;rizzly Beai 0 0 0
Furbearers 9 9 2
Small Miamimals 2 2 9
Ducks 1 2 1
Geese 1 2 1
Ptarmigan 9 2 2
Bird Egg- 2 2 2
Freshwater Fish I I
Ocean Fish I I
Flora 22 2
1 = Primary Subsistence Resource
2= Secondarv Subsistence Resource
0 = Rarely Utilized Occurring Subsistence Resource
NA = Resource not Available
declined as did seasonal variation in employment. Median family
income rose to about $22,500, but purchasing power remained lower
than for other Alaskan communities. Household densities were high at
about 5.6 persons per unit. The city's utilities were considered
inadequate and recreation facilities limited. The NSB high school and
US Public Health Service hospital were reported to be the major
employers. -
Kaktovik - (Population 136; 87 percent Inupiat). Historically, the
village was a regional trading center for nomadic Inupiat. In recent
years the residents were forced to move three times to accommodate the
needs of the nearby DEW line Station. The EIS reported that the NSB
was the single largest employer in the village which, at the time the
FEIS was produced, relied heavily on subsistence hunting and fishing.
Unemployment was not seen as a problem, seasonal variation in
employment was not severe, and income levels had remained stable
since 1973 at about $16,500. Over the same period, costs increased and
purchasing power declined.
Nuiqsut - (Population 161). One of three abandoned villages
resettled after passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
Nuiqsut was incorporated in 1973, according to the FEIS. The FEIS
stated that although cultural ties to the area had brought people to the
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village, opportunities for employment would be needed to sustain the
population. Two thirds of all jobs were with government and
construction. However, many of the jobs required higher education
levels than local people possessed (especially for men). Median family
income rose to S12,000 by 1976 but some families remained very poor.
Potential expansion of the NSB services and investments by the ASRC
were expected at the time.
Prudhoe Bay /Deadhorse (1976 Population 5,531). Oil development
camps for SOHIO/BP and ARCO drilling operations cover an area of
259 km 2 (another figure of 995 km 2 was given in a different section of
the text) and include twelve multiple well-drilling pads, each with up
to six wells. In 1976, the area housed about 1000 permanent workers
and a transient population of about 5,500. Each camp is self-contained
with water, electrical and sewage systems, recreation, and personnel,
administrative and dining facilities. Agreements ensured that the
enclave was not to depend on the NSB for any essential services
although 90 percent of the NSB's budget comes from taxes on Prudhoe
Bay facilities.
The proposal was expected to result in the following impacts:
" Population increases for each village were likely to be small.
" Many of those people coming to Barrow would not be
I nupiat.
" Borough revenues could be expected to rise considerably.
" New housing and utilities were expected for each village.
" Delays in petroleum development would aggravate an
already serious deficit position expected for NSB in the early
1980s.
Cultural Resources
It is generally accepted that groups of North Asian hunter/gatherers
migrated across the Asian-American land bridge during ancient
periods of low sea level. These early inhabitants most likely utilized the
low coastal plain which,. at least during the Pleistocene low water
period, probably extended out to the barrier islands. Theoretical
reconstructions of the paleoecological condition of the time indicated
one area of the lease site to have a "medium" probability of having
marine archeaological sites. Remains have been located at several dry
land sites believed to be similar in historical character.
Many sites remain undocumented and therefore both terrestrial
and marine archaeological and paleontological sites could be affected
by constuction or dredgmg. Disotption ofbiological resources-ofthe
area could also reduce the anthropological value of many sites since
current subsistence lifestyles constitute much of these sites'
information value. In some cases oil contaminates could ruin artifacts
or decrease the quality of radiometric dating techniques. The FEIS
reported that structures within sight of cultural resources will
significantly affect their environmental context.
The estimated probability of there being submerged sites was
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considered by the FEIS to not be sufficient to warrent remote sensing
surveys, but no information was given to document how this
probability was determined. While mitigating measures were said to be
expected to keep impacts to a minimum, the only measure outlined
was a proposed Pragmatic Memorandum of Agreement with the
Advisory Council on Historical Preservation which would set out' the
responsibilities and obligations of both DOI and the Geological
Survey.
Visual, Recreation and Tourism and Wilderness Resources
Visual. An area of limited physiographic and vegetative relief, the
dominant visual characteristics of the lease sale area are water in many
forms and highly variable and rapidly changing light conditions.
Lakes cover 50 to 75 percent of the coastal plain and numerous braided
rivers meander and form large deltas intersecting the ocean. Daylight
hours range from 24 in summer to none in winter and light conditions
are complicated by frequent fog and low cloud ceiling conditions.
Several maps in the FEIS showed the areas expected to be within
sighting distance of several areas of pristine natural environments.
Despite the fact that very few of the possible sites are shown on the
maps, much of the lease area would nonetheless be affected. The FEIS
reported the impact to be low, however, since there are so few people in
the area and those areas within sight of Prudhoe Bay are already
affected.
Recreation and Tourism. Tourism was described as virtually
nonexistent in the lease area since there was limited transportation and
an exceedingly harsh environment for those not accustomed to the
area. What activity existed was confined to nearby Barrow and
Prudhoe Bay.
Except for unauthorized increases in recreational fishing, these
activities were not expected to change due to the proposal.
Wilderness. The Arctic National Wildlife Range (ANWR) (3,560,000
ha) is located to the east and adjacent to the lease sale site. Other th'an
noting that the entire coast is "de facto wilderness", the FEIS gives no
discussion of the wilderness potential and value of the ANWR and
those areas adjacent to it. It also indicates that no rivers had been
proposed for inclusion in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, nor were
sites proposed for the National Register of Natural Landmarks.
Although no direct impacts were expected on the ANWR, the
pristine quality of the regional environment was expected to decline
and a potential landmark at Foggy Island Bay to be affected by the
dispersed location of oil and gas facilities along the coast.
Transportation Systems
Air Travel. Air was reported to be the most flexible and reliable
transportation mode to and from the lease sale area, but also the most
expensive. Air operations appeared to be in line with demand: single
gravel runways at Kaktovik and Nuiqsut and a paved runway at
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Deadhorse. The Federal Aviation Administration predicted a 33 per-
cent increase in operations from 1976 to 1986.
Increased passenger loads from oil activity were expected to be a
very minimal part of the total operations for the major airports
(although the effect on the village runways was not discussed).
Marine Transport. Marine freight was described for the State-operated
marine highway and for private barges. Anchorage, Whittier, Valdez,
Seward and Haines are the major ports. The choice of port was
reported to depend on which modes of travel were to be used for
continuing on to the lease sale area. During TAPS construction,
additional capacity at these ports would have been used had it been
available, but rationing was implemented to reduce disruption of
normal patterns. In 1979, only the causeways at Prudhoe Bay were
direct ports for the North Slope, requiring extensive (and expensive)
lightening to get goods to shore. The primary difficulty was reported
to be the limited shipping season which required a large-scale but
short-term use of vessels. Stress on other services could be reduced by
extending the season but the required ice breakers are few and very
expensive to utilize.
The capacity of neither the southern ports nor the regional
barges were expected to be overextended by increased oil and gas
activity. The MacKenzie River route was expected to be the preferred
choice since the shallow draft of the barges would reduce the need for
lightening materials to shore.
Rail and highway transportation systems were considered
primarily internal and secondary as transport for goods and people to
the lease area. Most food supplies were expected to be trucked to the
lease area from Fairbanks along the Prudhoe Bay highway.
Impacts were expected to be slight for both rail and highway
systems. Between 5000 and 9500 truck loads were estimated over the life
of the field with possible over capacity use of the highway resulting
di'ring the peak use years.
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